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Sammanfattning 
Syftet med studien är att undersöka hur Svenska Dagbladet och Hufvudstadsbladet 
framställde Rysslands president Vladimir Putin under 2016 med hjälp av gestaltningsteori 
(framing). 
Studien visade att den dominerande allmänna gestaltningen var s.k. spelgestaltning (game 
framing) i bägge publikationer. 
Putin, när han omnämndes, var ofta en sidokaraktär. Beskrivningarna var i regel fria från 
värdeord, men han framställdes likväl ofta som farlig eller hotfull. Detta skedde i mycket 
högre grad i Svenska Dagbladet än i Huvudstadsbladet. Putin gestaltades på många olika 
sätt i texterna, men de andra persongestaltningarna var mindre frekvent förekommande. 
Nyckelord: Gestaltningsteori, kvantitativ innehållsanalys, Svenska Dagbladet, SvD, 
Hufvudstadsbladet, HBL, Vladimir Putin, Ryssland 
 Abstract 
The aim of this study is to analyse how Svenska Dagbladet and Hufvudstadsbladet 
framed Russia’s president Vladimir Putin during 2016 using framing theory. 
The study showed that the dominating overall frame was game framing in both 
publications. 
Putin, when mentioned, was often a side character. The descriptions of him were as a 
general rule free from value laden words. Nevertheless, they managed to frame him as 
dangerous and aggressive on a regular basis. This occurred much more frequently in 
Svenska Dagbladet than in Hufvudstadsbladet. Several other sub-frames were used to 
describe his person, but they appeared less frequently. 
Keywords: Framing theory, quantitative content analysis, Svenska Dagbladet, SvD, 
Hufvudstadsbladet, HBL, Vladimir Putin, Russia 
1. Introduction 
In old days men had the rack. Now they have the press. That is an improvement 
certainly. But still it is very bad, and wrong, and demoralising. Somebody – was it 
Burke? – called journalism the fourth estate. That was true at the time, no doubt. But 
at the present moment it really is the only estate. It has eaten up the other three. The 
Lords Temporal say nothing, the Lords Spiritual have nothing to say, and the House of 
Commons has nothing to say and says it. We are dominated by Journalism. In America 
the President reigns for four years, and Journalism governs for ever and ever. 
– O. Wilde (1891, p. 309) 
A modern myth, a political enigma. Ruler of a country that spans eleven time zones. 
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin is many things. This thesis concerns itself with said man 
because he is one of the longest sitting rulers of Russia. To be more precise, it 
concerns itself with the way the man and politician Vladimir Putin in portrayed in two 
Nordic newspapers during 2016. 
When Putin likely finishes his current term in 2018, he will have ruled Russia as a 
president and prime minster for almost two decades and thus significantly shaped 
Russia’s way after the Soviet union dissolved. If Putin is re-elected in 2018, he will 
have spent more years in the highest echelons of power in Russia than for example, 
Joseph Stalin. 
Looking at the way news organisations portray presidents is nothing new. Plenty of 
research on how American presidents are presented and framed exist, both in the States 
and in a foreign context. However, this is not true for recent Russian leaders. This 
needs to change, with the times and with the changes that have occurred on the political 
stage in recent years. 
Currently there are, to the undersigned author’s knowledge, no essays on this topic that 
are being written in Sweden. This is remarkable and should be remedied post haste 
since we are talking about our (geographically speaking) closest super power, with whom 
we have several common interests (such as the Baltic Sea). The little research there is, 
in addition, is mainly qualitative, making it difficult to be sure of what is happenstance 
and what is an actual trend, without also consulting one’s gut feeling. 
This thesis is therefore a unique contribution to better understanding the Nordic idea of 
Vladimir Putin, a man that everybody knows of but next to nothing about. Unlike much 
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of the previous research, this study avoids specific and very limited time periods such as 
the Crimean crisis, and instead has a more holistic approach in order to avoid extremes.  
It also serves as a possible future reference point for comparisons to other future 
Russian leaders, or even to previous images of Putin, should one feel so inclined. 
Several scholars (see de Vreese et al., 2017) inquire after non-election time framing 
research. This makes 2016 a solid choice. 2016 was, in many ways, a rather calm year 
for President Putin. There was no reelection to think about, Crimea was largely 
cemented as Russian and so far the trade embargo hadn’t been too detrimental. The 
major point of tension was the Syrian war, and towards the end of the year, the 
allegations that Russia had been involved in the American presidential election.  In 
short, the year was about as normal as it would ever get in world politics. 
One might ask oneself why not focusing on policy papers instead of news articles? The 
reasoning behind that is easy. The media is often known as the third or fourth estate, a 
testament to its importance and power when it comes to the work of regular civil 
servants. One might have to do as the politicians say, but the third estate (sometimes 
called the fourth estate, depending on what kind of government), in turn, holds a sway 
over them. 
Any press officer worth her salt knows that whatever the public opinion is, she must 
take it into account when she formulates her message(s) since communication does not 
exist in a (political) vacuum. Same rings true for journalists. As Götz wrote 
”Needless to say, these questions [of Russia–Western relations] are of utmost 
relevance, not only for scholars in the ivory tower of academia but also for 
government officials in Washington, Brussels, Kiev, and elsewhere”. (Götz, 2016,. 
p. 250-251)  
One question that arose during the time spent conducting this study was ”where does 
Russia end and Putin begin?” and ”why focusing on Putin and not Russia simply 
Russia?” The reasoning behind this is, as Shevtsova (2005) writes, that power is 
personal in Russia. Power is centered on one person, and currently that person happens 
to be Putin. According to her, this is not uncommon in Russia, the same was true for 
Putin’s predecessors, and is a contributing factor to why the leader usually handpicks his 
successor: it is the safest way to not end up behind bars once you have abstained from 
power. As we will come to see, previous research points in the same direction: Putin is 
the narrative nucleus in plenty of news reporting about Russia. However, it will here be 
explored if this remains true for this study, too.  
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At first glance, this topic might seem to stray a bit from my chosen degree programme 
that focuses on organisational communication. However, it is not that far-fetched. As a 
person whose aim is to work within a public organisation that specialises in Nordic–
Russian/Eastern Europe relations, solid knowledge of is Vladimir Putin is an asset.  
Putin’s approval ratings are acceptable, and most expect him to continue in office for 
another six years from 2018–2024. This means that Putin and his politics will continue 
to affect the work in different ministries for years to come. As will the way we portray 
and view him shape our interpretations of his actions.  
Furthermore, this study shows how large media organisations chose to do this portrayal. 
While the individual journalist surely matters, there are cultures and expectations in 
media organisations that affect the tone and the angles chosen. Publishers are not exempt 
from context. What is suitable and what isn’t is not just a solo decision, regardless of 
how appealing the idea of the lone writer/truth seeker/journalist is. Instead, the authors 
are often recurring, and frequently chosen to write about a specific subject because the 
ones above them in the hierarchy felt like they did well in previous cases. In this 
broader sense, this study is external organisational communication, as communicated by 
specific, chosen individuals. 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2. Aim and Research Questions 
The aim of this essay is to examine and compare how Vladimir Putin is positioned and 
assessed in the Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet and the Finnish newspaper 
Hufvudstadsbladet after Crimea and before the 2018 election. The comparison is made 
because Sweden and Finland have much in common, but historically speaking, very 
different experiences of Russia. As we will see further along, Sweden is known for their 
Russophobia and Finland for their Finlandisation. 
The research aim will be reached through a quantitative content analysis against the 
theoretical backdrop of framing analysis, paired with a qualitative close reading of four 
of the texts. 
A. To what extent are the newspapers using either an issue, a game or a strategy frame 
in their texts when writing about Putin and his endeavours? 
B. How is Putin’s person positioned and assessed in the articles? 
C. Where do the newspapers differ in their portrayal, and where do they agree? (Based 
on the previous questions). 
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3. Background 
3.1 The Other 
The Other (introduced by Hegel in the late 18th century) is a concept long used in 
anthropology and sociology. It was popularised in media studies thanks to Edward Saïd’s 
seminal work ”Orientalism” (1978), but the concept of the Other in this particular field 
have roots all the way back to Mikhail Bakhtin. Bakhtin claimed already during the 
1920’s that the Other had the status of an epistemological, as well as an ontological 
necessity: the subject cannot know itself or the world without the Other since meaning 
is born where consciousness meets, i.e. in discourse (Neumann, 1999, p. 13, Bakhtin, 
1990). 
In his work ”Uses of the Other – ”The East” in European Identity Formation”, Iver B. 
Neumann argues that the idea of the East is a fundamental part in creating and building 
European identity. He asserts that when Europe ”discovered” Russia they treated it very 
differently from other faraway places like the Indies. Neumann writes that this was the 
first whiff of a trend where Europe tends to treat Russians ”… as what can be called 
the liminal case of European identity.” (Neumann, 1999, p. 67) 
Russia is said to be close, but not there yet. In other words, they could be us [the 
West], but they are not there yet–instead they serve as a mirror into the Western past, 
before Europe became what they decided was ”civilised” (Neumann, 1999). During the 
course of centuries, Russia has been depicted as many different things in the West. 
However, during more recent times it has been represented as a both socially and 
economically backward place (Neumann, 1999, p. 97). Initially, the February revolution 
did seem like a good thing according to the West, but this soon changed (Neumann, 
1999, p. 99). By the 1920s Soviet (Russia) was viewed as a threat, but only one among 
many (Neumann, 1999). 
However, during the Cold War they were upgraded to The Threat Par Excellence 
(Neumann, 1999, p. 100). Neumann writes that 
”The other inscribed itself in the temporal dimension of the European self’s 
identity by giving a name to a period of its history. Indeed, the Soviet initiative to 
end the Cold War was made among other things by means of issuing an 
application to join Europe: The slogan of the ”Common European 
Home.” (Neumann, 1999, p. 102)  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At the time of the release of Neumann’s book, representations of the Nordics’ large 
Eastern neighbour chiefly concerned itself more with the possible future Russia, rather 
than the present (Neumann, 1999, p. 107). 
Partially Russia is/has been viewed as a learner of Western practices, and through 
becoming more like the West they are expected to be less of a threat (Neumann, 1999, 
p. 108). However, recent events have given some the impression that Russia is doing 
the opposite of this, and this might affect the framing of Vladimir Putin.  
3.2 Russophobia 
Generally, Russophobia is described as a fear of or intense dislike toward Russia and 
Russian phenomena, its politics, or customs of the former Soviet Union (the Oxford 
Dictionary). While Neumann might be Norwegian, he does not often delve specifically 
into the Nordic countries’ relationship with Russia and their feelings towards the country 
in his books. However, in an edition of Østforum, a journal for Eastern European 
Studies from a Nordic perspective, researchers shed light onto their respective countries’ 
relationships with Russia a few years back through the prism of narratives in newspapers 
and foreign policies.  
Johnny Rodin, in his opening editorial of the above-mentioned journal, concludes that 
Russia is a crucial point of reference for all Nordic countries. Rodin describes Russia as 
the Significant Other in accordance with Neumann’s canonised work on Russia as 
Europe’s other. He writes ”Ryssland är antitesen som bekräftar den svenska och nordiska 
självbilden.” (”Russia is the antithesis that confirms the Swedish and Nordic self-image”) 
(Rodin, 2010, p. 126, author’s own translation) and ”Det nordiska >>jaget<< kan alltså i 
hög grad ses som en reflektion av den ryska >>andre<<.”  (The Nordic >>I<< can thus 
to a high degree be viewed as a reflection of the Russian >>Other<<) (2010, p. 122, 
also author’s own translation). Below, we will go deeper into Finland’s and Sweden’s 
relationship with their great neighbour. 
3.3 Finnish–Russo Relations 
In Ryssland i Finlands i historia: några särdrag som påverkar (2010) Vihavainen writes 
that it is common to refer to History with a capital H when talking about Russian–
Finnish relations. In his article, which also is one of the texts in the aforementioned 
Østforum, he calls  the shared history a ”unique” and a hard-earned  legacy, not to be 
wasted or ignored. According to Vihavainen the discourse of Russo–Finnish relations is 
different from those in the other Nordic countries (Vihavainen, 2010). 
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Despite the fact that Russia has been the biggest threat against Finland’s existence and 
political autonomy on several occasions, Finland has maintained very close ties with 
their Eastern neighbour (Vihavainen, 2010). One example of this is trade. Russia was 
one of Finland’s biggest trade partners until 2014. However, after the annexation of 
Crimea this was affected by the embargo that was placed on Russia. 
Vihavainen argues that ”ryssänviha”, or Russophobia first appeared during the 1700s due 
to Finland being a ravaged buffert zone during the Russo–Swedish wars. It should also 
be noted that ”viha" means ”hate”  in Finnish, and is in many ways a stronger feeling 
than just general ”fear”. However, back when the term was coined, the word ”Russians” 
was also applied to Finnish speaking ethnic Karelians (Tarkiainen, 1986 in Vihavainen, 
2010). 
In 1809, Sweden lost Finland to Russia, and Finland consequently spent more than a 
century as a part of the Russian commonwealth. When independence was gained in 
1917, it came at a high price in form of a civil war between the Whites and the Reds. 
It also lead to a very strong dislike of Russians in Finland, since the common opinion 
was that Russia was behind the Reds, and thus to blame for the war. The White troops 
won, if there is such a thing as a victory after a civil war like that. 
WWII (the Winter War and the Continuation War) did little to rehabilitate the negative 
view of Russians. However, the relations improved after the war, in many ways thanks 
to the agrarian Party’s leader, and later President, Urho Kekkonen. Nevertheless, the term 
”finlandisation” was coined during this era by American and German social scientists 
who argued that Finland was under Soviet’s red thumb, and in a way had lost a large 
chunk of its independence. This was denied by many Finns. Vihavainen is of a different 
opinion. ”One can rightly claim that during the 1970s and still by the 1980s  that 
Russia was not something than one hated or feared, au contraire. One had become 
surprisingly uncritical.” (Vihavainen, 2010, p. 192) 
Vihavainen (2010) concludes that Russia has always been too big to have an equal 
relationship with. Thus, the isolation politics from the past decade has been beneficial 
for Finland, and maybe for Russia, too. According to Vihavainen, Russia has been wars 
and mayhem, but also possibilities. From 1917, until now, the people in the two 
countries have lived separately, but with today’s globalisation, this is slowly changing. 
Where that will lead the countries remains to be seen. 
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3.4 Finlandisation 
As mentioned above, Finlandisation (Finnish suomettuminen; Swedish: finlandisering) is a 
term that was coined during the Cold War. It refers to the process (or result) of having 
to favour, or at least not openly oppose a much bigger country, despite the fact that the 
countries are not political allies (Nationalencyklopedin, 2016). This allows the smaller/less 
powerful country to keep its (nominal) independence and its own political system 
(Nationalencyklopedin, 2016).  
The name of the term stems from ”Finland” and the country’s actions and policies 
towards the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Nationalencyklopedin, 2016). 
The term has negative connotations and while mainly describing Finland’s actions during 
the cold war, it has also been used to describe other imbalanced power relations 
between various countries. 
3.5 Swedish–Russo Relations 
Sweden and Russia have fought wars at eleven separate occasions. The relationship 
between the countries has historically largely been one of tension. In the beginning they 
were rivals when Sweden was a ”super power”, but later the bigger of the two countries 
has been viewed as an existential threat against the now much smaller and less powerful 
one. 
In short: Sweden has been taking Russia into consideration ever since the 1600s. 
However, since the iron curtain fell Sweden has joined the EU and is thus part of a big 
power alliance where Russia isn’t particularly welcome. Sweden has also not shied away 
from criticising Russia when it comes to human rights and similar topics. What could 
possibly enable this behaviour? Maybe the fact that Sweden is no immediate neighbour 
(but still very close) and is neither dependent on Russia’s hydrocarbon arsenal, nor trade 
extensively with them? Dahl argues that one reason for Sweden’s ability to ”stand up 
to” a bigger country is that Sweden could be called a ”moral superpower”, which gives 
them certain rights and a certain amount of power (Dahl, 2006). The expression ’moral 
superpower’ has been used by influential Swedish politicians such as Reinfeldt and is a 
”thing” even beyond academia (see Sydsvenskan, 2009 and Marcal, 2015 for a few 
examples).  
The fact that different EU countries have unique relationships with Russia is something 
that several international relations scholars and organisations have charted. One of them 
is The European Council of Foreign Relations (ECFR). 
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ECFR is an international think-tank that states in their description that they ”build 
coalitions for change and promote informed debate about Europe’s role in the world.”. 
Among their trustees we find names such as Carl Bildt and Helle Thorning-Schmidt. 
ECFR writes in a report that they have found five different categories of relationships 
that an EU country might have with Russia. They range from ’trojan horses’, ’strategic 
partners’, 'friendly pragmatists’ and 'frosty pragmatists’ to 'new Cold-warriors’ (Leonard 
& Popescu, 2007). 
Sweden is, together with eight other countries, categorised as a ’frosty pragmatist’ (p. 
42, 45). That means that ”While keeping business interests high on the agenda, the 
governments of these countries have not refrained from criticising Russia's human rights 
record and failings on democracy.” (Leonard & Popescu, 2007, p. 42) 
In contrast, Finland is categorised as a ”friendly pragmatist”. That means that they, 
according to this report, have a 
”… less close but still significant relationship with Russia, in which business 
interests come first. Their policy tends to follow pragmatic business interests, opting 
for a path of least resistance in political dispute.” (Leonard & Popescu, 2007, p. 
42) 
3.6 The Crimean Crisis 
When talking about Putin in 2016, it is impossible not to mention the Crimean crisis. 
Describing what happened during the crisis in less than an A4 even more so. The 
narrative is fraught with tension, and in some ways varies, depending on one’s 
perspective. 
In short, the ”crisis” started in November 2013 when Ukraine's then president, Viktor 
Yanukovych, was faced with a country heading towards a financial disaster (BBC, 2014). 
He had to make a choice between a deal with the EU in order to increase and 
strengthen integration and trade, or accepting a 15 USD billion loan from Russia, which 
would mean moving towards a planned ”Eurasian union” with Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. He chose the latter option (BBC, 2014). 
This sparked protests on Maidan in Kiev. The president and his associates tried to assert 
control and put an end to them, but this the protesters turned out to have hydra like 
qualities. The protestors were from different camps, coming from very different factions: 
liberals, moderates, technocrats, pro-European activists and far-right nationalists (BBC, 
2014). 
By mid February, the number of deaths among the protestors had reached well into the 
hundreds and a peaceful resolution seemed less and less likely. On the 21st, protestors 
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overtook the Yanukovych’s residence and he fled to Russia, not only fearing for his life, 
but to also avoid the charges that were likely to be brought up due to the killed 
protesters (BBC, 2014). 
Towards of the end of the protests, Russia performed a surprise military drill close to 
the Ukrainian border and at the Black Sea base on Crimea. Around the same time, 
armed soldiers in unmarked uniforms took over regional government buildings and 
airports around the peninsula. Russia claimed they were local self-defence groups and 
had nothing to do with Russia. (BBC, 2014) 
Crimea, being more autonomous than many other regions in Ukraine, voted in a new 
government and decided to hold a referendum on whether Crimea should become a part 
of Russia or not (The referendum was only meant to "confirm" a parliamentary vote to 
secede, and only had two options: join Russia or enhance Crimea's independence). A 
majority voted for a reunion with the great neighbour (BBC, 2014). It should be noted 
that around 60% of the people living on the peninsula identify as ethnic Russians and 
that The Soviet Union gave Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, during a time when no one 
entertained the possibility that the Soviet Union might cease to be. 
3.7 2018 Election 
The 2018 presidential election in Russia takes place on the 18th of March next year 
(2018). The original plan was to hold it on March 11th, but a group of Members of 
Parliament in Moscow voted to have it moved so that it coincides with the fourth 
anniversary of the above-mentioned annexation of Crimea (it was the date when Putin 
publicly declared that Russia was seizing the peninsula). 
If the first round of the election results in no one attaining an absolute majority, then a 
second voting round will take place on the 8th of April three weeks later. 
Vladimir Putin is eligible to stand for reelection, but has not confirmed, at the time of 
writing, that he will do so yet. However, in early August he hinted at it when he spoke 
at a public gathering near Lake Baikal in the Russian Republic of Buryatia (TASS, 
Interfax). 
Who else will be running is not yet set in stone, but among the names listed we find 
Alexei Navalny, Anatoly Batashev, Grigaory Yavlinsky och Vladimir Zhirinovsky. 
However, unless a strong enough challenger is found, the presidential election will 
largely be nothing but a referendum on public confidence for the incumbent president. 
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4. Previous Scientific Studies and Other Materials 
4.1 Exploring a Partially Academic Lacuna 
As stated in the introduction, this part, previous research (or rather, the lack thereof), is 
both the strength and the weakness of this study. A  strength since it makes this study 
unique, and a weakness since it means that making comparisons with other studies is 
difficult, and to see if the results obtained here line up with previous findings is more 
of a challenge. 
Nevertheless, the university’s database access paired with language skills resulted in 
some findings. While largely not research that pertains to the Nordic countries, it is 
nevertheless research that concerns itself with the image of Vladimir Putin in both an 
Eastern and Western context. 
We begin with the image that was planned by Putin and his associates in his 
autobiography First Person, and then move on to independent writings on the topic. 
4.2 First Person 
The main reason for including First Person (2000) as reading material is that it is a 
starting point for this research area, and is a good measuring tool as it shows how 
Putin and the piarchiki (the charming Russian word for PR people) want to portray him, 
the image they want to create. 
First person (2000) could be described by a book reviewer as a ”campaign biography.” 
Surely, Putin had already been elected when it came out, but due to his tabula rasa 
status, the biography was needed by the piarchiki  in Kreml’s high towers to establish 
him as a likeable person. The book consists out of six interviews with three different 
journalists, as well as talks with Putin’s (now ex) wife and two children. 
 
 The book is divided into nine parts and they are chronological in order. All parts are 
named after different aspects of his person that the journalists (and likely the piarchiki) 
want to highlight. As an example: Part five is called the Spy. Part six is the Democrat, 
seven the Bureaucrat, and so on. 
In this study’s coding scheme, some of the frames are in part based on the aspects first 
mentioned in this book, such as Putin’s KGB past, and his hyper-masculinity. 
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In the first part of the book, Putin tells the journalist how he was an unspoken leader 
in school for a while, his dedication to his judo club (despite hardships) and his former 
teacher describes him as very dedicated and ambitious, after having grown up and left 
his rascal days behind him (Putin, 2000).  
In part two Putin describes himself as having been ”… a pure and utterly successful 
product of Soviet patriotic education” (Putin, 2000, p. 42). He also talks of a ” 
negative” character assessment he received: ”Later, when I went to intelligence school, I 
once got an evaluation, where they wrote the following as a negative character 
assessment: ” A lowered sense of danger”. (Putin, 2000, p. 36) This lays well into the 
humble-bragging of the book, and yet helping the image of the Tough Macho Man. 
The book repeatedly implies how well suited he is for presidency. For example, a 
retired colonel at the Red Banner Institute said about Putin ”You need organisational 
abilities, a certain degree of tact, and a businesslike manner. It seemed to me Putin had 
all that. He was a steady student, without slips” (2000, p. 53) and a few lines down, 
”There were no slips. There were no incidents. There was no reason to doubt his 
honesty and integrity.” (Putin, 2000, p. 53) 
Putin’s wife described him as plain and dull in the beginning (Putin, 2000, p. 59), and 
when asked what then drew her to him, she answered ”Perhaps it was his inner 
strength, the same quality that draws everybody to him now.” (Putin, 2000, p. 59) 
The book also highlights his past as an FSB agent (Federal Security Services of the 
Russian Federation). On page 73 one of the journalist who interview him comments on 
this ”They wanted to portray you as a super-spy. And you’re denying 
everything.” (Putin, 2000, p. 73), and later, on page 85, he is characterised as an 
everlasting agent, despite having left the bureau. 
The book manages to frame Putin as a not too exciting character, while still leaving 
enough breadcrumbs so that the reader can suspect that there is something more than 
just a fastidious bureaucrat. It portrays him as a steadfast and capable leader with few 
or no vices. In short, just what Russia wanted after the rather turbulent years with 
Gorbachev. 
4.3 Putin as Celebrity and Cultural Icon 
In the academic anthology Putin as a celebrity and cultural icon (ed. Helena Goscilo, 
2013) eight researchers from different fields examine different aspects of Putin’s persona. 
Through these different portrayals of Putin, the authors try to assess how Putin’s media 
image is constructed and presented in various media outlets. 
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Not all of the findings made in this volume are of use to this study, despite them all 
being interesting. Therefore, only the findings relevant to this study and other previous 
findings are presented here in a slightly condensed version. Since most of these studies 
are qualitative in their nature, it is impossible to say how general they are, but the 
arguments are compelling. 
In the article Putin’s performance of masculinity: the action hero and macho sex 
subject Helena Goscilo writes that 
”Historically, three cultural paradigms codifies heroic masculinity – a cultural 
construct and social practise shaped by the ethos of a given society, albeit 
traditionally posited in essentialist terms: those of (1) the warrior, (e.g., Alexander 
the Great), (2) the philosopher (e.g., Socrates), and (3) the ruler, who optimally 
synthesizes the other two (e.g., Pericles).” (Goscilo, 2013, p. 183). 
All in all, Goscilo concludes that Putin fills the criteria for a ruler. However, one 
significant contributing reason for this is because he came after Yeltsin, who was 
mentally weak towards the end, overall in bad shape, and Putin was the opposite of 
that. Also, after the Kursk incident Putin managed to create an image of thoughtfulness, 
competency while also showcasing his athleticism at opportune moments. (2013, p. 184) 
Later in the article she further discusses how Putin uses plenty of military imagery, 
fashion and expressions despite having no military background. 
The military discourse, or perhaps the personalisation of the military discourse is also 
found by Ryazanova-Clarke in a later chapter. She writes that during the (now a Russian 
classic) ”direct line with the president”, Putin is constructed as not only a president but 
also a clear military commander for the Russian nation (p. 121). This framing occurs 
through Putin using military terminology and slang during the interview, and the 
presenter using his military title (Commander in Chief), rather than ”President Putin”. 
This frame does not occur in his own autobiography, and is likely a later addition to 
his ”persona package”. However, as we will shortly see, this matches with later findings 
of Putin being an aggressor as well as the tendency to favour persons over 
organisations. Goscilo (2013) actually describes Putin as Russia’s ultimate celebrity” and 
an ”objet d’art”, in short the ultimate main character (Goscilo, 2013, p. 6). 
A few chapters into the book one reaches Cassiday and Johnson’s article A personality 
cult for the postmodern age: reading Vladimir Putin’s public persona. A cult of 
personality in a medialised world (2013, p. 45). Cassiday and Johnson write that a cult 
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of personality is nothing foreign in Russia, but unlike the ones that flourished in the 
Soviet Union the current one is ever changing and dynamic (Cassiday and Johnson, 
2013, p. 46). Putin’s cult differs from Stalin’s in that it ”…does not appear to exist 
primarily as a result of ’official coercion’” (Cassiday and Johnson, 2013, p. 46). Another 
difference is that when people attend rallies in favour of Putin they do so because of 
some profit, not because they are avoiding punishments (Cassiday and Johnson, 2013). 
Instead, this cult ”…represents the product of distinctly postmodern social and 
communicative relations.” (2013, p. 3) 
Mikhailova also comments on the topic and writes 
”On this basis one may suggest that Putin-era society represents the ultimate 
instance of a postmodern society of the spectacle, generating a simulacrum of 
democracy in which the entertainment provided by politicians offers a surrogate for 
an (absent) political life.” 
(Mikhailova, 2013, p. 78) 
The question that arises is what the spectacle is in Western newspapers? Is this image a 
surrogate for something else as well? Such as actual information about current policy 
questions, issues that currently affect the country? 
Putin was a tabula rasa, onto whom journalists (as well as politicians and regular 
citizens) could project traits that they desired him to have. New media also means 
significantly less control over the image (p. 49). Due to social media ”Putin mania” is 
polysemantic, and easy to tailor to a sub group’s needs. 
Perhaps this is also true outside of Russia, that a certain type of Putin is what we need 
in order for our narrative to work out. And is our Nordic idea of him polysemantic as 
well, or do all things point in one direction only? The Russian image of him is quite 
engrossing. Levada, based on polls of the Russian people, described the image of Putin 
like this: 
”A former KGB officer with a confident walk and  shy smile, a tough 
administrator of disarming simplicity, a market-orientated reformer willing to 
increase state control over the market, and a touching father who can fly a jet and 
uses military slang in his speech”. (Fartyshev, 2004, p. 35 in Mikhailova, 2013, p. 
65) 
While overall, this anthology is an invaluable contribution to understanding the way 
Putin is presented it has its weaknesses. First and foremost the articles tend to focus on 
Russian sources only and to not compare them to sources from other countries, which 
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leads to the aspects of Otherness not being paid a lot attention. This also means that 
they, for better and for worse, only observe Putin when his control over his image is at 
its strongest, and not what it looks like when the journalists have fewer restraints. 
4.4 The German Image of Putin during the Crimean Crisis 
Das Bild Russlands in den deutschen Leitmedien – die Berichterstattung über Russland 
und Wladimir Putin im Rahmen der Ukrainekrise (The image of Russia in leading 
German Media During the Ukraine Crisis) is a book by Danny Schmidt from University 
of Erfurt in Germany (2016). The book analyses the image of Russia and Putin during 
the Crimean crisis in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Der 
Spiegel. 
In this qualitative discourse analysis Schmidt tries to show and explain how reality is 
created and influenced by media. Through his analysis he uncovers patterns in the 
narratives surrounding the crisis and points towards which mechanisms influence them. 
Some of his findings coincide with those of Goscilo among others, and others are more 
unique. Below we will take a further look at the findings, newspaper by newspaper. 
4.4.1 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
The narrative in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) is very much personalised 
through Putin and Merkel (a ”personalising discourse”) (Schmidt, 2016, p. 82). As 
prominent sub-themes he describes the ’military discourse’, about strategies and 
possibilities. The military aspect of Putin also occurs in Cassidy and Johnsons findings 
(2013, see above). 
Schmidt further writes that the military discourse is connected to the personalised 
discourse where ”…Putin is portrayed as a player…”. (Schmidt, 2016, p. 85) 
Another, slightly different part of the strategy/military discourse is the media wars and 
how Putin utilises it (Schmidt, 2016).  
Another important discursive trend Schmidt observes is the ”enterprise 
discourse” (Schmidt, 2016, p. 88). This discourse contains themes such as the EU, 
sanctions, but also other values such as freedom and justice (Schmidt, 2016, p. 88-89). 
According to Schmidt, FAZ favours Western values such as freedom, equality and 
justice, and, according to their line, produces fairly conservative journalism (Schmidt, 
2016). FAZ also makes a clear difference between Us and Them (Schmidt, 2016, p. 89). 
As seen when we read Neumann’s Uses of the Other. The 'East' in European Identity 
Formation, this finding was to be expected. That the military discourse is one of the 
more prominent themes lines up with the idea of Putin as a military man also found in 
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Goscilo et al. (2013), despite having no such past. However, as the president is also the 
Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Putin, 
nowadays, holds the final responsibility for it. 
4.4.2 Süddeutsche Zeitung 
Also in Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ), Schmidt notices the ’enterprise discourse’, the 
’military discourse’ as well as the prominent ’personalising discourse’. However, the 
most prominent discourse is the military one that is created through words such as 
Warfare, Peace talks and Aggression (Schmidt, 2016). Both Putin and Russia are 
portrayed as dangerous and at war. 
Another discourse that is slightly more common here than in FAZ is the ’historic 
discourse’. It is created through such themes as ”will Putin recreate the Soviet Union”? 
This idea connects to a wider set of ideas, such as the Cold War and the different blocs 
according to Schmidt (2016, p. 93). It also implies that Putin is dangerous (assuming 
that we fear the military and political implications it holds). This speculative type of 
journalism generally belongs under the game framing umbrella and is generally common 
in news journalism (de Vreese et al., 2017). 
Drawing on the different blocs, it becomes apparent that again, the Us and Them idea 
regarding Western Europe and Russia as described by Neumann is largely intact.  
Schmidt finds that SZ focuses more on Putin’s person that the FAZ (Schmidt, 2016, p. 
96). This, again, lines up with the findings made by Van Aelst et al., where individual 
politicians are more mentioned more often in news texts than institutions (2017, p. 128). 
Schmidt also observes that the SZ, despite their liberal, left-leaning identity, produces 
sentences that are more on the liberal to conservative side on the spectrum (Schmidt, 
2016).  
4.4.3 Der Spiegel 
According to Schmidt’s findings the Spiegel articles do not discuss the info wars 
(Schmidt, 2016). However, they, like FAZ and SZ, rehash ideas through the historical 
discourse, for example by reactivating the collective symbol ”Hitler” (Schmidt, 2016, p. 
101). They also reproduce the dichotomy of the rational West and the emotional East 
(Schmidt, 2016) as also mentioned by Neumann (1999). This is especially true for an 
unpredictable Putin who gets to embody this when he is portrayed as if he is mainly  
led by his emotions in his decisions (Schmidt, 2016, p. 103). In addition, the 
personalisation discourse (occurs again) is used on specific people and emphasises their 
human characteristics (Schmidt, 2016, p. 103). 
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Putin as the aggressor is common sense in the narrative (Schmidt, 2016). This also lines 
up with the findings by Cassidy and Johnson (2013). Schmidt further writes that Putin is 
almost always personalised in the texts, and almost never occurs in his function as the 
democratically elected head of state for one of the world’s most powerful countries 
(Schmidt, 2016). 
When summarising his findings in his final chapters, Schmidt writes that the 
personalising discourse plays the most important part in the reporting. ”The narrative 
nucleus is Putin as central and discourse leading subject in the news coverage of the 
crisis.” (Schmidt, 2016, p. 144). Taking this into account, focusing on Putin only in a 
study, rather than Russia in general seems very justifiable. This is also consistent with 
the findings made by Von Aelst et al. (2017) that we will look deeper into below. 
Overall, the research is well executed and the different discourse categories have been 
useful when creating a coding schedule and defining the parameters. However, what is 
lacking is the transparency in what influenced his own analysis. The analysis seems to 
be fair, but opening up about one’s own background and thoughts would be beneficial 
for the reliability in a qualitative discourse analysis. 
4.5 Comparing Political Journalism 
Fresh from the printing press, Comparing Political Journalism  (ed. C. de Vreese, F. 
Esser and D.N Hopman, 2017) has gathered a large number of researchers from all over 
the world to conduct an in depth quantitative study of what shapes and influences 
political news coverage. In total, they covered 16 countries during a constructed fortnight 
(14 days during three months) (de Vreese et al., 2017, p. 16). The reasoning behind this 
is that it will avoid sample distortions (such as exceptional events such as elections and 
terror attacks to mention a few).  
As it happens, Sweden is one of the countries participating. Finland, however, is 
inconveniently absent from the study. Nevertheless the book gives a good overview of 
trends in political journalism. 
According to the authors of this book, there are six key concepts for political news 
journalism research: Strategy framing, interpretative journalism, negativity, political 
balance, personalisation and soft versus hard news (de Vreese et al., p. 3) This book is 
where they put this theory to practice. Much like this study, they decided on a research 
design with comparable countries (de Vreese et al., p. 11). 
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The  study poses several hypotheses for every key aspect. Their third hypothesis 
regarding the strategy frame aspect is that ”The amount of game and strategy frames is 
higher the closer in time the country is to a major election.” (2017, p. 36). They found 
that their hypothesis was confirmed. They also found that elite newspapers were more 
likely to use the game strategy frames than so called mass marked newspapers (2017, p. 
47). 
One of their other findings was that one-third of the materials analysed had traces of 
interpretative journalism (de Vreese et al., p. 51). 
As stated by de Vreese (2009, 2017), game and strategy frames are generic news frames 
and can thus be used on a variety of issues. According to Aalberg et al. (2017), certain 
types of issues are more likely than other to be strategy framed. The game frame is for 
example more likely to be present in public policy issues and during election times. 
They argue that it is important to apply this kind of research not only during election 
times, but also on ”regular” news (p. 35). This has been a shortcoming of the vast 
majority of framing studies but this thesis does its share to even the numbers. 
The game frame refers to news narratives where politics are portrayed in game terms: 
who is winning or losing an election, up and downs in public opinion, speculations 
about policy outcomes and potential collaborations over the party borders (de Vreese et 
al., 2017, p. 37). They found that the levels of game and strategy framing are according 
to their findings much lower when there is no election during the corner (p. 39). 
A strategy frame, on the other hand, is found in news narratives where the emphasis is 
on motives for certain actions, where one positions oneself on issues, strategies for 
reaching a certain political goal. How a politician makes choices about her leadership 
and personal traits also fall under this category (de Vreese et al., 2017, p. 37). Mentions 
of press behaviour is also under this frame umbrella (de Vreese et al., p. 37). 
These two frames are viewed as different dimensions of an overall macro frame, so in 
order to differentiate between them, the researchers decided that the dominant frame was 
dependant on length, frequency, and also that special attention should be given the 
headline and lead paragraph in case of uncertainty (de Vreese et al.,2017, p. 39) 
They decided, after their trial run to use a generic ”strategic game frame” and not 
separate the two, despite them making a theoretical distinction between them. They write 
that ”Our empirical analysis does not support constructing two separate dimensions for 
game and strategy frames.” (de Vreese et al., 2017, p. 40) Their factor analysis carried 
out did not support their idea of the strategy and the game frame as two separate 
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dimensions. (de Vreese et al., 2017, p. 49) They write that focusing on one single 
dimension, however, does not affect the main conclusions (de Vreese et al., 2017, p. 
49). This is an interesting change from previous research by the same group, and if they 
will stick to it in the future remains to be seen. 
Another of the key concepts is personalisation. Personalisation ”…refers to the growing 
importance of a select number of individual politicians at the expense of institutions 
such as political parties or governments.” (Aelst et al, 2017, p. 112–113). They further 
write in their chapter of the book that this trend is generally supported by empirical 
studies , with very few exceptions. (Aelst et al., 2017, p. 114). 
This book offers a unique operationalisation of comparative political journalism. 
However, the insight in their processes was limited which was frustrating since it often 
was kept at a rather abstract level. An increased transparency in their coding processes 
would have been an interesting and beneficial addition. 
This book is of high relevance to this study. Not only is it one of the most recent 
large contributions to the field of framing theory, but it also compares the results 
between different countries overall, i.e., not during one specific event, which again 
makes its conclusions more applicable overall. 
4.6 Images of Putin during the Ukraine Crisis 
In the only article included in this chapter we finally find a study that involves the 
trinity of this essay: Putin, a Swedish newspaper and Finnish news media organisations 
of different kinds. In ”Lännessä olemme, itään katsomme" (In the West we are, to the 
East we look/gaze) Jarkko Kangas, Markus Ojala and Mervi Pantti (2015) explore the 
image of Putin and Russia that a select number of major news outlets create with their 
choice of images by applying framing analysis. 
The aim of their study was to answer three questions: how did the chosen media outlets 
frame the Ukraine crisis picture-wise, what role did Vladimir Putin play in the images, 
and what kind of ideas and discourses regarding Russia surfaced? The materials were 
chosen from Helsingin Sanomat (FI), YLE (FI), MTV3 (FI), Dagens Nyheter (SE), the 
Guardian (UK) and Die Welt (DE). In total they analysed just over 570 units. 
Focusing on the Finnish findings on Putin’s role only, they conclude that during the 
MH17 crisis, Putin was portrayed as ”… syytettynä, vahvana johtajana ja toisena” (2015, 
p.199) (accused, a strong leader and other). However, during the Minsk negotiations that 
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followed Putin was portrayed as ”…vastuullinen, johtaja, arkkivihollinen ja 
voittaja” (2015, p. 200) (responsible, leader/boss, arch enemy and winner). 
They also found that foreign publications (the Swedish one included) emphasised Russia's 
role in the events that transpired more than the Finnish publications did (2015, p. 201). 
While, again, more transparency regarding the process would have been interesting they 
reach several interesting conclusions and the sheer amount of texts (500+) assures us 
that they can point towards clear trends. 
4.7 Short Summary 
• First person is not research, but a spin doctored piece that is almost two decades old. 
It portrays Putin as the piarchiki wanted him to be in the early days of his 
presidency: a boring, trustworthy family man with an edge (provided by his FSB past). 
• In Goscilo’s anthology from 2013 Putin is mainly viewed through Russian sources. He 
is shown to be a macho man, a leader and as a personification of Russia through his 
cult of personality. However, his cult of personality is suspected of being entertainment 
and a surrogate for a lacking actual political life.  
• Schmidt finds several interesting discourses regarding Putin and Russia in his studies. 
Those who pertain to Putin specifically and are of special interest are the 
personalisation discourse, Putin the player, Putin the dangerous/the aggressor. 
• Comparing Political Journalism discusses key concepts for political news journalism 
research. Some of their more interesting findings include the popularity of 
personalisation of news and that game/strategy framing continue to be the most popular 
framing method for news media organisations to use. 
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5. Theory 
5.1 Framing theory  
Framing theory first saw the dim light of day in a poorly lit university corridor when 
the renowned sociologist Erving Goffman brought about his book ”Frame Analysis” in 
the mid seventies. Since then, the theory has evolved, grown, and proven to also be of 
great use in the field of communication studies. 
A ”frame” can be found in any conversation, media or other human way of expression. 
The way something is framed is likely to influence a person to react or respond in a 
certain way (Deverux, 2009). This of course makes framing an interesting tool for 
researchers who are into strategic political communications since politics, in the end, 
often is about being approved by ones voters and getting re-elected. 
Jesper Strömbäck, perhaps Sweden’s most well known framing theoretician, builds his 
research and contributions to framing theory on the framing theory of Robert Entman. 
Entman is today considered a groundbreaker in the field of framing theory and 
communications studies. His definition of framing is one of the most famous and 
commonly used: 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem 
definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation 
for the item described.  
(Entman, 1993, p. 52) 
Entman wrote that a frame can be identified by ”[…] the presence or absence of 
certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, sources of information and 
sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments”. (Entman, 
1993, p. 52) 
When Strömbäck first started writing about news framing he wrote that there were  
four different ways to frame political news: Issue, trivia, sensation or game frames 
(Strömbäck, 2004). However, in his more recent research he utilises primarily the issue, 
game and strategy frame (Strömbäck, 2009). In the book Comparing Political 
Journalism (2017) where Strömbäck makes a contribution, they have however 
seemingly decided to skip the Issue frame. This essay, however, will use the issue 
frame as it is an efficient way to see how well journalist follow the ideals of 
reporting. 
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Prof. Jesper Strömbäck writes that media frame stories and reality through the inclusion 
and exclusion of certain information and individuals (2000). This in turn makes the 
reader interpret and understand the text in a specific way (Strömbäck, 2000). Strömbäck 
(and others) thus takes a rather constructivist approach with the concept of reality and in 
short breaks with the tradition of thought /epistemological-philosophical idea that started 
with Plato, and that in modern times was championed by prominent thinkers such as 
Hume and Leibniz. 
Strömbäck instead views the media not as a mirror, but as a rather small part of it 
since there is a limit to how many different perspectives a text can contain before it 
becomes incomprehensible. This inevitably will give any reader of any given text a 
reconstructed view of the world (Strömbäck, 2004). 
Framing theory however, still suffers from the question ”What is a frame?”. Despite 
there being several different views on this question, some definitions are used more than 
others. I have, in this essay, chosen to use Jamieson and Capella’s definition from 1997. 
They suggest three criteria that a news frame should fulfil. It should 
i. ” […] have identifiable conceptual and linguistic characteristics. 
ii. […] be commonly observed in journalistic practice. 
iii. […] be possible to separate and distinguish the frame reliably from other 
frames.” 
(Jamieson and Capella, 1997, p. 47) 
Strömbäck and his collaborators have defined the main frames in the subsequent way: 
Issue framing: This frame puts emphasis on tangible happenings, what has happened, 
what has been brought up or is something that in an obvious way relates to political 
content (Strömbäck, 2004, 2009). In short, this frame refers to objective political 
content and real actual/objective conditions in reality that are relevant to the political 
content (Ibid.) Issue framing is what most media scholars would like to see as it is 
closest to the current journalistic ideals. 
Game framing is part of a bigger macro frame (Aalberg et al., 2017, p. 38). This 
frame focuses on politics as a game. The emphasis is on who is winning or losing 
something, whether it be elections, debates or public opinion (gallups and vox pops). 
Speculations about elections, including possible coalitions also belong in this frame 
(Strömbäck, 2009, Aalberg et al., 2017, p. 37) 
On the other side of the same macro frame coin we find the strategy frame. This 
frame covers news stories where the emphasis is on interpretations of politicians’ (or 
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parties’) motives, their tactics and strategies for achieving their goals, political or 
policy ones. Why this action? Why this position on this issue? Campaign strategies are 
part of this, too. In this frame, the choices regarding leadership and integrity are 
found. (Aalberg et al., 2017, p. 37) Other things that also are part of this frame is 
media strategies and press behaviour (Aalberg et al., 2017) 
However, this essay’s main focus is Putin, and it will therefore use sub frames 
(variable 7–16). The raison d’être for sub frames is to make the analysis more 
nuanced and to get a closer look on how his image is built.  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6. Method 
For this essay a mainly quantitative method is employed, backed up by a smaller 
qualitative component for increased transparency. 
What makes Content Analysis (CA) a vital tool for not only communication researchers, 
but also press officers and their like is that it allows one to ”… construct indicators of 
world views, values, attitudes, opinions, prejudices and stereotypes, and compare these 
across communities.” (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 134). All these things are crucial 
when developing new communication plans, policies and when looking into what went 
wrong (see Murphy's law). 
There are about six different CA research designs (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p.135). 
This study is a longitudinal, cross-sectional analysis, which means that it compares texts 
about one specific theme (Putin) from different sources, over a longer time period. 
6.1 Sampling 
There are several things that are important to keep in mind when sampling the text 
units. One is representativeness. In a well made content analysis the exclusion or 
inclusion of any one unit should be of no importance, all sampling units should be 
replaceable by each other (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 137). Another factor is the size 
of the sample. A carefully and systematically collected smaller sample is better than a 
bigger one if it is one based on convenience (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 137). Sample 
size is in the long run a question of practicality — is it doable? This study codes 67 
articles from SvD and 49 from HBL. That equals every fourth article that mentions 
Putin during 2016. Lastly, the units of sampling and coding are of great importance to 
sampling. In this study one article equals one (1) unit. 
Theory and research material are brought together by coding and classifying the sampled 
materials. However, every realistic and pragmatist content analysis researcher knows that 
this takes time: there needs to be sufficient piloting, then amendments and then more 
piloting before the ”real” analysis begins (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). 
Quality in content analysis is not a black and white matter, despite that it is considered 
a rater empirical approach and is full of numbers. The reason for this is that it is a 
social construction. So how does one achieve a desirable and objective outcome? 
According to Bauer and Gaskell, one does that when one delivers interesting results that 
can withstand scrutiny (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). They also add that coherence and 
transparency are two other important criteria for evaluating how well executed a study is 
!24
(Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). With ’coherence’ they mean that the analysis is consistent 
internally and that all codes flow from the same principle, rather than simply coding 
what pops up in one’s mind (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). 
Regarding transparency they conclude that it is of outmost importance to provide the 
readers with a summary list of all codes and frequency distribution for each code (Bauer 
and Gaskell, 2000, p. 143). Documenting the coding process with great care and detail 
helps the researcher to achieve public accountability, as one simultaneously enables other 
researchers to replicate the study, should they so desire (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000).  
6.2 Reliability 
In short, reliability is an ostentatious word for when interpreters of a text are in 
agreement. It can be achieved in different ways. For example the same researcher may 
make a first coding, then wait some time, and then make a second interpretation in 
order to determine intrapersonal reliability (2000, p. 143). Nevertheless, demanding 
perfect reliability is asking the impossible where human judgement is used, which means 
that one instead must reflect upon what a sufficient level of reliability is (Bauer and 
Gaskell, 2000). 
Another factor is that reliability might differ between different codes, some of them 
might be more open to interpretation or more likely to be influenced by prior 
experiences than others (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 144) In short, reliability is decided 
and limited by how complex the coding frame is. Lowered reliability might also point 
towards a polysemic text, i.e., that it can be interpreted in several different ways (Bauer 
and Gaskell, 2000, p. 144). 
According to Bauer and Gaskell, ”Reliability only indicates an objectified interpretation, 
which is not a necessary condition of a valid interpretation.” (2000, p. 145). In their 
opinion, content analysis coded by actual humans ”…suffers from overscrutinity that at 
times approaches a reliability fetish.” (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 148–149) 
One strength of content analysis, however, is that it is systematic and often public since 
it is common practice to use materials that occur naturally, such as newspapers.  
Citations, out of context can very easily mislead or manipulate. In order to display to 
the readers how the interpretations are made and how valid they are, in addition to 
consistent, I have decided to add a qualitative element to this essay. Thus, In addition 
to the quantitative analysis, I will also perform an in depth analysis of four (4) articles, 
to demonstrate my thoughts and reasonings.  
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Content analyses often focus solely on frequencies, which leads them to forgetting about 
rarities and what is absent. Naturally, CA can in principle code absence too, but usually 
leans towards coding presence. The idea is that the qualitative part of this analysis will 
help countering that. 
6.3 Validity 
If an analysis’ results represent the text, it could be said that the study has good 
validity (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). However, there are several forms of validity.  
Regarding the data, it is desirable that the codes relate to the units in the texts, 
commonly called semantic validity (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000). Then there is sampling 
validity, which means that the sample accurately represents the whole available body of 
texts. Lastly, there is construct validity that has to be taken into consideration. That is, 
that the coding frame must concretise the theory behind the analysis. 
Bauer and Gaskell have a rather pragmatic understanding of the topic  
”The validity of a CA must be judged not against a ’true reading’ of the text, but 
in terms of its grounding in the materials and its congruence with the theory of 
the researcher, and in the light of his or her research purpose.” 
(Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 133). 
6.4 Method Criticism and Discussion 
As with the vast majority of all academic productions, further research is needed to 
confirm and strengthen the results further. Regardless of that the number of units should 
give us an idea of whereto the wind is blowing. 
Bauer and Gaskell (2000) write very fondly of transparency, and in order to increase the 
transparency in this study, certain aspects of this study should be publicly addressed and 
acknowledged. First of all, all photographs of Putin and others have been left out. While 
omitting them was a deliberate move, it could be argued that the images work as 
”attention catchers”, that what might be most important to a reader is the headline and 
the photo that belongs to it (if the article has photos). In short, images matter because 
they help to ”lure in” the readers to read on. Assuming that the photo in some ways 
affect how the text is perceived altogether is not too far-fetched. However, since many 
images are stock images, do we know if the journalist herself choses the image? Or is 
it some other instance in the office that makes this decision? I chose to exclude them, 
assuming that most journalists do not actively write an article with a specific photo in 
mind. 
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Another limitation to the project was Retriever because the database generated two 
articles that didn’t even mention Putin and cut some of the articles in half when saving 
the files for printing, meaning that every article had to be double checked manually in 
order for me to see if indeed the whole article had been analysed. While I have coded 
large numbers of news texts before, the experience is still limited. To counter that I re-
coded 12 articles after having done them all, to check intracoder reliability. I also 
considered it necessary as one sees more when one codes text no. 76 than text no. 4. 
Also, there is the risk of subjectivity. Subjectivity is a human condition that cannot be 
helped. I have, however, tried to battle it and in order to be as transparent as possible I 
have created a thorough coding book, and shown my thought patterns in four qualitative 
interpretations of some of the articles. That way, any reader can hopefully decide for 
herself if she finds my analysis skills sufficient and my interpretations valid.  
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7. Material 
Why news articles? Because the text corpus is the way a community expresses and 
represents itself (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000, p. 133). 
7.1 Selection 
The materials chosen for this study were two conservative newspapers, one from Sweden 
and one from Finland. Svenska dagbladet (henceforth SvD) describes itself as ”obunden 
moderat” (SvD, 2017), i.e., liberal conservative and was founded in 1884. 
Hufvudstadsbladet was founded in 1864 in Helsinki and describes itself as ”oberoende 
borgerlig liberal”, which also means liberal conservative (Berg, 2015). Both newspapers 
are politically independent. Both are written in Swedish and reach a nationwide audience.  
The reasons for selecting them are that they are similar in their views, are high up on 
the press freedom index (Freedom House, 2017), and have a close and shared history 
while still having very different relations with Russia (see previous chapters). 
SvD is the third largest morning paper and is made in Stockholm. It is today owned by 
the Norwegian conglomerate Schibsted. They call their editorial liberal conservative. 
Editor-in-chief since 2013 is Fredric Karén. Hufvudstadsbladet is the largest Swedish-
language newspaper in Finland. It is located in Helsinki. Editor-in-chief is currently 
Susanna Ilmoni. 
7.2 Modus Operandi 
This sub-chapter explains how the procedure was executed. Every article is viewed as 
one (1) unit of analysis. The articles from SvD and HBL were retrieved from the 
Swedish media archive called Retriever. 
Retriever media archive is an online archive that provides full text newspapers from 
primarily Sweden and its neighbouring countries. It thus contains both SvD and HBL. 
When picking the materials from Retriever, no difference is made between print 
materials and web materials due to the fact that they often are the same. Also, in a 
time where many people read their newspapers online only, ignoring the online content 
would be a mistake. 
In order to find articles where Putin is mentioned, his name, Vladimir Putin was typed 
into the search field. After that certain restrictions were added. In the first round, the 
perimeters Svenska Dagbladet, the time frame 01.01.2016–31.12.2016. This yielded 
hundreds of hits. In order to narrow it down to a reasonable amount, every fourth 
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article was downloaded for coding (the articles were first sorted in chronological order, 
then the selection was made). The same actions were then repeated with HBL.  
When analysing  four texts in a more qualitative manner in order to create the desired 
transparency, a randomiser was used to pick them. A quick visit to random.org resulted 
four numbers (one fills out a form to generate numbers and the site then uses 
atmospheric noise to create true randomness). The same site was also used by de Vreese 
et al. (2017) in their study. 
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8. Results 
8.1 Quantitative Analysis 
In this part of the essay the results of the data collected will be shown and explained. 
In total, there were 67 articles from Svenska Dagbladet and 49 from Hufvudstadsbladet. 
Together, more than 100 articles were analysed. However, since the materials from the 
individual newspapers are less than 100 articles, all numbers will be displayed both in 
absolute numbers and in percentages and not only in percentages. We will start with the 
bigger picture and then break it up in more detailed pieces. Ergo, we will start with the 
main frames (first both newspapers together, then separately) and after that move on to 
the subframes. 
Before we start crunching numbers, let us a take short moment to take a quick 
refresher: What frame is what? First of all, The dominating overall frame refers to the 
general frame of the text, i.e framing in the title, lead paragraph and body text 
combined. 
The issue frame refers actual political decisions, opinions and actions. The game frame 
in turn refers to how the political game is played, who sides with whom and what it 
might lead to. The strategy frame refers to interpretations of actions, why this is 
happening and what the motives are. This frame is closely linked to the game frame.  
Other refers to titles that don’t fit any of the frames mentioned above while there still 
is a connection to politics. 
Not applicable refers to titles that either don’t exist or lack any connection to politics. 
For a more thorough description, please see the coding book and scheme in appendix 1. 
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8.2 Main Frames 
Dominating Main Frames in SvD and HBL combined 
43 of 116, i.e almost two-fifths of the texts were dominated by the game frame. Second 
largest frame in this category is somewhat surprising the Other frame. This could imply 
that there is a rather large number of ”soft news” where Putin occurs as a character. 
 
 The bronze winner is Not applicable, which hints at a future discussion of our need to 
mention Putin also when we do not talk of politics. Lastly, the Issue frame and the 
Strategy frame were the least common ones at 10, and 9, respectively. 
Frame in title in SvD and HBL combined 
Formulating titles is an artform. The most common frame here is Other, around 35% of 
the titles have that frame. Quite a large number of titels are Not applicable, almost one-
third of them do not relate to politics. 27/116 are game framed and only 8 titles are 
strategy framed. 
Frame in lead paragraph in SvD and HBL combined 
Amount of articles 
using a frame
%
Issue frame 10 9 %
Game frame 43 37 %
Strategy frame 9 8 %
Other 35 30 %
Not applicable 19 16 %
Total: 116 100 %
Amount of articles 
using a frame
%
Issue frame 14 12 %
Game frame 27 23 %
Strategy frame 8 7 %
Other 42 36 %
Not applicable 32 28 %
Total: 116 100 %
Amount of articles 
using a frame
%
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The most prevalent frame is, again, Other, closely followed by the Game frame (31 out 
of 116 lead paragraphs). Once more a quite large number of lead paragraphs do not 
relate to politics (24/116), a few are Issue framed and focuses on matters (16) and a 
very small number are explaining and strategy framed in nature (6). 
Frame in body text in SvD and HBL combined 
The most common frame in the body texts is the Game frame, about one-third are 
mainly framed this way. 32 are framed as Other, and 29 as Not Applicable.  Both the 
Issue frame and the Strategy frame occur in 10 texts.  
Looking at the numbers it becomes apparent that they are very similar to the numbers 
of the Overall dominating frame above. However, Not applicable differs the most as the 
number of body text being not applicable are much higher here than in the overall 
dominating frame. This points towards the fact that, indeed, titles and lead paragraphs do 
a lot for deciding what the overall dominating frame is, especially when in doubt. These 
numbers align fairly closely with those of ”frame in title” and ”frame in lead 
paragraph”. 
8.3 Sub Frames 
Putin’s narrative role in SvD and HBL combined 
Issue frame 16 14 %
Game frame 31 27 %
Strategy frame 6 5 %
Other 39 34 %
Not applicable 24 21 %
Total: 116 100 %
Amount using a frame %
Issue frame 10 9 %
Game frame 40 34 %
Strategy frame 10 9 %
Other 32 28 %
Not applicable 29 25 %
Total: 116 100 %
!32
Almost 75% (89 of 116) of the article use Vladimir Putin as a side character and as a 
main character in 27 articles. This is a somewhat bewildering finding. The question that 
now arises is: is this common for leaders of global superpowers? 
Father of the country frame in SvD and HBL combined 
Putin as the Father of the country only occurs in one (1) of 116 articles. 
Putin the Man frame in SvD and HBL combined 
Another rare frame, Putin is described as a manly man in only one of 166 articles. 
Whether this is caused by different ideas of masculinity and what a leader should be 
like, or simply that it is superfluous to explicitly state because the idea is already so 
etched into our consciousness, is impossible to say. To catch more subtle nuances, a 
qualitative approach is needed. 
Putin the FSB agent frame in SvD and HBL combined 
Three (3) of the articles allude to Putin’s past as an FSB agent. The rest (113) do not. 
This implies that we either do not care for his past, or, again, that it is so commonly 
known that stating it again is unnecessary. 
Putin the aggressive/dangerous frame in SvD and HBL combined 
Putin is deemed as dangerous or somehow threatening in 22 out of 116 texts (almost 
one-fifth). This lines up with previous research made by Kangas et al., and Schmidt. 
Putin the dictator frame in SvD and HBL combined 
Main character 27 23 %
Side character 89 77 %
Yes 1 1 %
No 115 99 %
Yes 1 1 %
No 115 99 %
Yes 3 3 %
No 113 97 %
Yes 22 19 %
No 94 81 %
Yes 4 3 %
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Putin is declared an autocratic or undemocratic leader in four (4) articles out of 116. 
Putin the morally questionable frame in SvD and HBL combined 
In just under one-tenth of the articles Putin is framed as a person of moral flexibility. 
Putin the peace maker frame in SvD and HBL combined 
Putin is framed as a president who wants to contribute to peaceful solutions in six (6) 
texts. In the rest he is not. 
Putin the person frame in SvD and HBL combined 
I total, Putin’s private life is mentioned once (1). In the rest of the articles (115) it is 
not. 
How is Putin assessed in SvD and HBL combined? 
Putin is portrayed in a favourable way in six (6) texts, in a negative manner in 17 and 
neutrally in the rest of them (93). ”Neutrally” is a bit deceiving as we saw earlier that 
he is portrayed as aggressive, which in many ways is negative. This is the sort of frame 
that is notoriously difficult to quantify. This Aspect only codes ”blatant” assessments, but 
the implicit ones are ignored since they are very difficult to quantity. Nevertheless, the 
category ”Putin the aggressor” (above) gives another inkling.  
No 112 97 %
Yes 10 9 %
No 106 91 %
Yes 6 5 %
No 110 95 %
Yes 1 1 %
No 115 99 %
%
Favourably 6 5 %
Unfavourably 17 15 %
Neutrally 93 80 %
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8.4 Comparisons 
Having looked at the two newspapers together it is time to separate them and look at 
where the two newspapers differ in their portrayal.  
Dominating Frame 
Comparing the newspapers we see that (in terms of percentage) the game frame is more 
common in SvD than in HBL and that the Not applicable is more prevalent in HBL 
than in SvD. The Issue frame and the Strategy frame are equally (un)common in both 
newspapers. Other is more common in SvD than in HBL. 
Frame in title 
Again, the newspapers are fairly close in their framing patterns. However, they clearly 
differ in their tendency to use Other and the Game frame where SvD is more likely to 
use both. It is slightly more common in HBL to mention Putin just for the sake of 
mentioning him in contexts that are not political. This could be an indicator of the 
slightly different relationship the two countries have with Russia. A possible explanation 
as to why SvD is more likely to mention him in a setting that is political but not fully 
game or strategy framed could simply indicate that their titles are rather polysemantic, or 
that the photos (that are not taken into account here) would have cemented the titles 
into a strategy/issue/game frame instead. 
SvD SvD % HBL HBL
Issue frame 6 9 % 4 8 %
Game frame 27 40 % 16 33 %
Strategy frame 5 7 % 4 8 %
Other 21 31 % 14 29 %
Not applicable 8 12 % 11 23 %
SvD SvD % HBL HBL %
Issue frame 7 10 % 5 10 %
Game frame 17 25 % 10 20 %
Strategy frame 0 0 % 3 6 %
Other 26 39 % 16 33 %
Not applicable 17 25 % 15 31 %
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A possible explanation for the low number of strategy frames in the titles is that titles 
are short, and a strategy explanation usually requires more characters. 
Frame in lead paragraph 
As far as lead paragraph patterns go, serval things emerge: Both newspapers are unlikely 
to use the Strategy frame here, and Not applicable is fairly common in both (but more 
so in SvD). It is also abundantly clear that SvD is more likely than HBL to use a 
Game frame in their lead paragraph (just under one-third vs. one-fourth). HBL is slightly 
more likely to mention Putin in articles that do not pertain to politics.  As we saw 
above in frames in titles, the amount of Strategy frames is very low. Same happens here 
and is possibly also because the lead paragraph is such a limited space. 
Frame in body text 
The most uncommon frame is the Issue frame in both newspapers, and the most 
common is the game fram (one-third). SvD is more likely to frame their body texts 
strategically. Other is used in roughly 3/10 cases by SvD and in just under one-fourth 
in HBL. Not applicable is also more common in SvD, but only by 5 percentage points. 
Narrative Role 
SvD SvD % HBL HBL %
Issue frame 8 12 % 8 16 %
Game frame 20 30 % 11 22 %
Strategy frame 4 6 % 2 4 %
Other 23 34 % 16 33 %
Not applicable 12 18 % 12 24 %
SvD SvD % HBL HBL %
Issue frame 7 10 % 3 6 %
Game frame 23 34 % 17 35 %
Strategy frame 10 15 % 4 8 %
Other 19 28 % 13 27 %
Not applicable 18 27 % 11 22 %
SvD SvD % HBL HBL%
Main 
Character
17 25 % 10 20 %
Side Character 50 75 % 38 80 %
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In SvD, Vladimir Putin is a main character in the article in one-fourth of the articles, 
and in one-fifth in HBL. As a side character he appears in three-fourths of SvD’s 
articles and in four out of five articles in HBL. In short, the man appears more often as 
a main character in SvD. 
Father of the country 
This frame only occurs once, and in one newspaper: SvD. 
Putin the Man 
Same as above, this frame only occurs once, and in one newspaper: SvD. 
Putin the FSB agent 
This is an uncommon frame in both newspapers, but statistically speaking it is more 
common in SvD (3%) than in HBL (2%). 
Putin the dangerous 
Putin is portrayed as dangerous more often in SvD than in HBL. In HBL he is 
described as dangerous in 8% of the articles, but in 27% in SvD. 
Putin the dictator 
SvD SvD % HBL HBL %
Yes 1 1 % 0 0 %
No 66 99 % 49 100 %
SvD SvD % HBL HBL %
Yes 1 1 % 0 0 %
No 66 99 % 49 100 %
SvD SvD % HBL HBL %
Yes 2 3 % 1 2 %
No 65 97 % 48 98 %
SvD SvD % HBL HBL %
Yes 18 27 % 4 8 %
No 49 73 % 45 92 %
SvD SvD % HBL HBL %
Yes 3 4 % 1 2 %
No 64 96 % 48 98 %
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The authoritarian frame is uncommon, but more common in SvD where 4% of the 
articles use this frame than in HBL where only 2% do so. 
Putin the crook 
In just under one-tenth of the articles Putin is framed as a person of moral flexibility. 
Putin the peace maker 
Putin the peace maker frame, how uncommon it might be overall, occurs more 
frequently in HBL than in SvD, 6 % vs. 4%. 
Putin the Person 
This is a very uncommon frame and mentions of Putin’s private life only occurs once 
in HBL, but never in SvD. 
How is Putin assessed? 
Here, the newspapers differ the most in their subframing. While ”complementing” Putin 
is a rare practise in both, it occurs slightly more frequently in SvD (7%) than in HBL 
(2%). SvD is however much more likely to assess Putin in a negative manner than HBL 
( 22% vs only 4%). SvD is neutral in seven out of ten articles, but HBL is neutral 
SvD SvD % HBL HBL %
Yes 6 9 % 4 8 %
No 61 91 % 45 92 %
SvD SvD % HBL HBL %
Yes 3 4 % 3 6 %
No 64 96 % 46 94 %
SvD SvD % HBL HBL %
Yes 0 0 % 1 2 %
No 67 100 % 48 98 %
SvD SvD % HBL HBL %
Favourably 5 7 % 1 2 %
Unfavouably 15 22 % 2 4 %
Neutrally 47 70 % 46 94 %
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more often, in 94% of their texts. This gives cause for looking deeper into the idea of 
finlandisation and Sweden as a moral super power. 
8.5 Short Summary of Findings 
• Both newspapers are mainly fond of the Game Frame. 
• The least likely overall frame is the Strategy Frame, very closely followed by the 
Issue Frame. 
• None of them is very likely to use any of the suggested sub frames, apart from the 
”Putin the dangerous” frame. 
• Putin is most commonly used as a side character. 
• The newspapers are largely in sync in their framing. Where they differ the most is 
their usage of ”Putin the dangerous” frame, which SvD uses more often. 
• However, both newspaper generally do not use value laden words to describe him and 
are in that way neutral of him in their assessments but SvD is more likely to frame 
Putin in a unfavourable way. 
• The least common sub frames are Putin the person, Father of the country and Putin 
the Man. 
• The high number of Other and Not applicable could imply that Putin is mentioned a 
lot in soft news or in a distinctly non-political capacity. 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8.6 Qualitative Analysis 
In order to better compare this study’s findings with those of prior ones, a shorter 
qualitative element was needed. The reason for this is that the vast majority of the 
previous research found is qualitative in its nature. It is also viewed as an opportunity 
to see what possible glitches the quantitative approach might have left us with, and 
maybe give us some ideas for further research. 
The procedure for this analysis was the same for all four articles. First, the explicit 
utterances were collected and analysed, and after that a second close reading followed 
where more emphasis was put on choice of wording and what it could implicate. In 
short, all the articles were read through. After that, one text at a time was focused at 
and then read through again with a highlighter (used on the more explicit findings), and 
lastly given comments in the marginals and arrows to the more subtle/implicit ones and 
reasons why they were interpreted in a certain way.  
The four articles can be found in appendix 4 in the back. 
SvD article #15: ”V ser hopp i det sänkta ryska försvarsanslaget” 
In this article (”The Left party sees hope in the lowered Russian defence spendings”) , 
the title is fairly open, not a winner and a loser per se, but also not an explanation, 
why is this happening. Nevertheless,  it clearly pertains to politics. The closest would be 
a speculation about an outcome, which firmly places this in the gaming category. 
In the lead paragraph the ”why” is slightly more developed. However, the first part of 
the lead paragraph is Issue framed (he finds the political proposal hopeful/good), and the 
ending has a touch of game frame, Hans Wallmark from an opposing party thinks the 
Russians are not to be trusted/playing some sort of game. 
The body text is a mix of several different frames, but the dominating frame is the 
Issue frame since it is a matter of two political opinions and comments upon a budget 
suggestion. 
Here, V and M are pitted (their opinions) against each other. That the Swedish Left 
Party are so hopeful and the Moderate party so sceptical plays into the historical 
narrative where the reds have always viewed Russia with kinder eyes than the 
conservatives. The historical discourse (as also found in Schmidt, 2016) occurs with 
comments on Soviet times and that Cold War made in the text. 
Putin’s name only occurs once, in the beginning of the body text. This cements him as 
an important and a responsible (guilty/responsible) character. There is no need to 
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mention him any further now. The Other has a face/name and we can just go on calling 
it Russia. It also poses Putin as a ruler/leader, and it seems like he alone makes this 
decision. Putin (the president, not mentioned to also be commander in chief) is behind 
the arms race. That is a threat according to most, present coder included. He is thus a 
(passive) aggressor. Interesting is that he is described, as the president to behind it and 
not as commander in chief, which would have been a more prudent title (and also 
explanation). However, it plays nicely with the narrative of Putin as a sole regent. 
”Gloss over” is a word that clearly connotes scepticism and also, in a way, siding with 
the cause that is glossed over by Putin.  
SvD article #48: ”Putin vill säkra dubbelseger” 
Putin is mentioned first thing in the title, in the lead paragraph of the article ”Putin 
wants to secure a double victory”. This cements him as a main character of the text, 
despite it being about the Eurovision song contest. The title is a very obvious game 
frame (it alludes to sport language) and the lead paragraph hints at a political game 
behind the ESC curtains. In the body text the focus is on who is winning and losing by 
Russia hosting the competition. 
Putin is framed as a competitive president who says that sexual minorities are not 
treated poorly in Russia. Assuming the reader has read several articles that say the 
opposite, Putin indirectly becomes a liar. Putin is portrayed as an excellent player of the 
political game ”… men vinner han [Lazarev] kommer segern användas som en symbol för att 
visa att situationen för homosexuella är okej.” (”…. But if he (Lazarev) wins, the victory 
will be used as a symbol to show that the situation for homosexuals is fine.”) 
The Othering occurs when Putin says that there is no LBTQ discrimination going on. 
This is viewed as untrue and is ”not done” in the Western world. Well, it does happen 
but it is largely condemned (especially in the Nordic countries). That a president would 
condone it sure is Other (strange) and different from the enlightened Us. This indirectly 
positions Sweden as the moral superpower (see Dahl, 2006). This article is also a clear 
example of what Iver B. Neumann’s ideas that Russia is what the East used to be, a 
mirror into its own past (1999). 
Putin wants to win. This portrays him as competitive (aggressive?) and also as a shrewd 
businessman who knows what to do to win the public opinion. It is also expressed that 
Russia/Putin only cares about how this looks to the outside, not to find any real solution 
to the issue. This article is speculating about a possible victory and what it would mean. 
The text makes it sound like Putin is orchestrating this almost personally. Like in 
Schmidt’s findings (2016), Putin is the aggressor, the power seems personal (like in de 
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Vreese et al., 2017). What other organisations that might have played parts (lobby 
groups and whatnot) are not mentioned. He is an indisputable main character, and more 
villain than hero in our Western eyes. It is about politics, but also not since it is 
officially about the Eurovision. The article has several layers and its polysemantic nature 
makes it a challenge to code. 
In line with what Kangas et al. found (2015) Putin is the Other, a leader, and 
responsible for what is happening. This affair might be smaller than Crimea but the 
patterns do repeat themselves.  
HBL article #20: HBL Obama och Putin möttes i Kina 
The  article ”Obama and Putin met in China” deals chiefly with a meeting of two 
political gigants. The title is a clear issue frame according to the coding schedule, and 
the same is true for the lead paragraph. The body text is a little bit more difficult since 
is pertains to the issue (Syria talks), but the majority of is focuses on who is siding 
with whom (Russia with Assad and the US with the opposition, but both are against 
ISIS) and the political game around the meeting. 
Again Putin is mentioned first, and then, lastly, it is mentioned that that meeting 
between Putin and Obama is nothing but political diplomatic window dressing and that 
the more crucial talks are held between Lavrov and Kerry. This is almost remarkable as 
this would imply that Putin isn’t almighty and makes all decisions.  
The tensions between the US and Russia in the Syrian war are mentioned, but it is also 
explained that they have a common enemy (ISIS) . This (sort of) mitigates the enemy 
idea and makes Russia less Other since they too oppose the terrorist organisation. 
Nevertheless, Russia is framed as ”worse” since they side with ”… enväldige presidenten 
Bashar al-Assad”, i.e., they are siding with a dictator (bad), and the US are siding with 
the opposition (who per definition must be better since they are not dictators). Also, 
here Western values shine through, just like Schmidt found in FAZ (2016). 
Same is true for the personalisation discourse, that the article spends more time talking 
about Putin here implies that he is the system. Also this coincides with Schmidt’s 
findings. In this way, the reporting from during the Crimean Crisis is not so different 
from the 2016 one. 
Not so much what was dealt with during the meeting is included in the text, which in 
a way a Game frame since two standpoints are pitted against each other and this is all 
about siding or not siding with another. No Strategy frame like ”why do they meet”, 
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etc. No issue? It is just briefly mentioned that they talked about things, one of the 
topics being Syria. That the topics are of little importance implies that rather the 
meeting in itself was (will they side or not) the important thing. Nevertheless, it is an 
Issue frame to say that they have met. But quite a thin one, and the passepartout is 
firmly game. 
HBL article #02: ”Ingen trodde Trump skulle vinna – förutom vi” 
The ”No one thought Trump would win - apart from us” title is obviously about 
politics, clearly about winning and losing, and also implies that the talker is good at 
predicting and playing the political game.  In the lead paragraph we see Putin described 
as a relaxed and sure man, a person who knows who the winner is (hint: it is him). 
Putin’s answers, paired with the comments about him using a strategy , etc., cements 
this. Here, he is the indisputable main character. 
An article about Putin holding this sort of press conference is reminiscent of a King 
giving audience and holding court. It also cements the idea of him as the most 
important political figure in Russia (which lines up with de Vreese et al.’s findings from 
2017 about the personalisation of politics and how individuals are more important than 
institutions). 
The articles says ”he says this” (which points towards this, like you can’t blame your 
failures on us), but then he smiles like a cat who got the cream (which opposes that 
implicitly). This description also alludes to him being unpredictable, and in the long run, 
untrustworthy and possibly dangerous.  
”…det här är något Putin excellerar i,  att säga en sak utåt men samtidigt signalera att 
han kanske har gjort exakt det han anklagas för.” (”… this is something Putin excels at, 
to say one thing outwardly but simultaneously signalling that he might have done 
exactly what he is being accused of.”) is a typical example of the game frame. This 
article is in many ways a more journalistic approach to a similar situation analysed by 
Lara Ryazanova-Clarke found at the end of each presidential term (2013). 
Putin is the Other in this text. This occurs through several different comments. First of 
all, he is said to embarrass specifically female journalists and saying tasteless things. 
This is contrary to the Nordic idea of equality (and feminism) as a chief ideology. 
Another way of Othering him is through pitting him against the US in the Syria war 
(assuming that the US is part of the West like Sweden and Finland). 
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The journalist interprets Putin’s facial expressions (he looks satisfied and self assured) 
and what might be the reason behind this (the american Election). Interestingly enough, 
the journalist manages to also only imply the involvement, and never outright say that 
he did it (a feat worthy a journalist who has covered Russia for several years). She 
describes these actions as ”power tools” that Putin uses to show that Russia is at 
advantage. 
Putin is also (framed as) slightly aggressive when he says that ”We are stronger than 
any potential attacker–in our defence, in our history, in our traditions and in our will to 
defend.” He somewhat softens it  by adding that this is in the case they would get 
attacked. Nevertheless, it has already been proclaimed and is now out there. 
In short, Putin is the Other, powerful, leader, smug and smooth shit stirrer who will 
come out of any kerfuffle with clean enough hands to avoid punishment. 
This article corresponds well to the personalisation discourse as the most important 
discourse around Putin as found by Schmidt (2016). There is no mentioning of other 
political organisations that might also have had a hand in the occurrences mentioned. 
The findings in the article also corresponds with the Other as found by Kangas et al., 
as well as a leader as found by Kangas et al. (2015) and to a degree, Goscilo (2013), 
too. However, the characteristics of a leader as found by Goscilo (2013) were not as 
clearly present. 
All the descriptions of him make Putin seem patriarchal, talking down to his sweet, silly 
children and is perhaps the closest we have been to the idea of Putin as a Father of the 
Country that was found in Goscilo (2013).  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9. Conclusions 
9.1 Framing 
Let us begin by trying to answer the first of the research questions, to what extent are 
SvD and HBL using different main frames in their articles? 
The most common frame used in articles where Putin is mentioned is the Game frame. 
This rings especially true for SvD. This means that the news (mainly politics) are 
treated in a manner that likens them to sports, games or wars. This lines up with 
previous findings (Strömbäck, 2009, de Vreese et al., 2017). This despite the fact that 
during 2016 there was no election for Putin to participate in (other than the American, 
some would say). One possible reason for the Game frame to be so predominating is 
that it is an ”easy” frame that does not require much prior knowledge and research from 
the journalist or the reader. 
However, what it does it that it obscures Putin’s political agenda. Due to that he also 
remains an undefined possible threat which allows one’s fantasy to run rampant. 
Every time an interpretation or and a prediction is made and then proved wrong, the 
idea of Putin as an unpredictable (and in the long run untrustworthy) leader grows 
stronger. 
 
 Strategy framing was uncommonly used by both newspapers. That such a low percentage  
of the units utilised it could mean that de Vreese et al. (2017) were right when they 
simply blended the Game Frame and the Strategy frame, but then again, doing so 
creates an undesirable loss of nuance. After all, a frame that focuses so much on the 
”why” is a frame that is vital for a reader to make sense of the world. 
Issue framing turned out to be quite unpopular among both the news organisations. An 
issue frame would give us more facts, would let us know more about what policies 
Putin has signed, vetoed, etcetera. However, looking at the results it is very apparent 
that we know very little of what actually happens, very little why, but a lot about what 
could happen, and who is currently winning and losing in the global political game. 
Founding one’s reality on ”whatifs" seems a rather dubious practice. 
Moving on to the two jokers in every coding scheme, Other and Not applicable 
something interesting happens. Looking at Dominating overall frame, they make up 
almost half of the frames. 
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Why is so much coded as Other? One reason is that there is no election going on in 
Russia right now, and that we therefore focus less on politics. Another could be the 
limited knowledge journalists have about Russia (there is not only a language barrier, 
but also a cultural barrier), which in turn makes it difficult to use the Strategy frame, 
and the Issue frame. Then again, that is probably also why the game frame is so 
common–you are allowed to speculate as a journalist. These things are characteristic of 
the Game frame, and looking at the findings in this study, 43/116 articles had the game 
frame as their dominating frame. That equals 37% and is thus very similar to the 
findings of de Vreese et al. (2017) where they found that around one-third of the data 
analysed in their study were Game framed. They also stated that game frames and 
strategy frames are more common the closer one is to an election (De Vreese et al., 
2017). Here, we know that the election is yet far away, but still they prevail. 
Perhaps Other is a sign of a compromise. Maybe journalists are unwilling to write too 
much game, but lack the background knowledge to write proper strategy frames? 
Lastly, Not applicable and its prevalence might in part be due to the doping scandals, 
where it was common practise to mention Putin as  it often was alleged that Kreml 
somehow might have been involved. Or, perhaps, simply Not applicable occurred so 
often because Putin is omnipresent in out consciousness, and referring to him in anon-
political setting only show how conscious we are of him, and how much of a household 
name he really is.  
9.2 Sub Frames 
Having looked at the main frames, it is now time to move on to the second research 
question and look deeper into the way Putin’s person was positioned and assessed in the 
two newspapers. 
A boogey man on the side lines 
Having coded more than 100 articles from 2016 certain tendencies and patterns emerge. 
First of all: Putin is mostly a side character in the texts. He is usually mentioned in 
passing, or in relation to another Politician, who is more important in the text. This 
thesis can’t, unfortunately, claim to explain why this is the case. Why is the leader of 
our (geographically speaking) closest super power often nothing but a side show in our 
news coverage and what purpose does he serve when he occurs? Perhaps the American 
Election played its part here. The allegations that Russia had meddled in the US election 
surely prompted mentioning Putin a lot, especially since personalisation is such an 
important trick. 
!46
Schmidt (2016, p. 144) found that during the Crimean crisis, Putin was the leading (and 
central) subject in the news coverage. However, that crisis is ”over” in this material and 
these texts offer data from a more ”general” and, first and foremost, longer time period. 
That Putin is a side character in so many instances might indicate that Putin is not 
always the narrative nucleus. 
The portrayal does not always follow pattern 
Another interesting  tidbit that became obvious was that the portrayal of Vladimir Putin 
does not entirely follow the pattern of previous research. Looking at the sub frames 
several of them rarely ever occur: 
It is highly uncommon that he is portrayed as an autocratic leader. Then again, officially 
Russia is a democracy. Calling him a dictator straight out would be taking quite a clear 
stand. He was after all elected. One could argue that the election lacked any real 
opponents and that parts of the proceedings were a bit shoddy, but nevertheless he won 
and retains fairly high approval ratings. 
Putin’s past as a FSB agent is not popular to mention, but it occurs. The reason for 
this (after all, it was several decades ago) is difficult to pinpoint exactly in this analysis, 
but it could be that it is used as a narrative tool to imply Putin’s general shadiness.  
He is not even once portrayed as a father of the country or as a macho man in the 
Nordic newspapers organisations included in this study. His private life is mentioned in 
one rare case. 
Why do the frames not follow pattern? Looking at the findings from Goscilo et al. 
(2013), it seems like there should have been an abundance of references to his 
masculinity, how he in a fatherly way takes care of the country, etcetera. There could 
be several reasons for this. Different operationalisations and media cultures are surely 
parts of this, as well as a different idea of masculinity. Another reason might be that 
this essay has focused on the letter part of the articles and the images have been 
discarded. Perhaps they would have contributed to a higher number of these frames 
being found. 
A reason why Putin is not described as a manly man in these texts could be because 
the idea of masculinity partially differs between different cultures. The Russian idea of 
masculinity could be viewed as over the top or ”funny” to the Nordic eye. However, it 
could also be because looks should be irrelevant when it comes to political news. 
All in all, not using all the sub frames could be interpreted as a small win for more 
neutral reporting. 
!47
Another possible theory, however, is that it is already superfluous. After all, Putin is one 
of the longest sitting leaders in Russia and most opinions regarding him have likely 
already been formed and cemented.  
No value laden words 
Rather unexpectedly, there are few clear assessments of President Putin. Putin is almost 
never explicitly good or bad in the texts, he is just ”nothing” or rather, ”neutral”. 
However, this result is slightly misgiving. In every article about the Syrian War where 
the peace negotiations/discussions between the US and Russia are mentioned it is often 
clear to the reader that the writer has sided with the US stance on the question and the 
fact that Putin says no to the suggestions, or is openly doing something that might harm 
the American idea of peace makes him an indirect villain. There are more subtle ways 
to pass judgement than to state it straight away. Unfortunately a quantitative analysis 
can’t catch all of that in its standardised net. 
Yet he is dangerous 
What this analysis did catch, however, was that Putin is partially portrayed as 
threatening and aggressive. He is described as unpredictable and he is said to cause 
tension in global politics with his actions. In several articles he is sometimes tossed in 
as some sort of political boogey man, an undefined threat. This corresponds to the 
findings made by Kangas et al. in 2015, where they found that Putin was portrayed as 
an ”aggressor” and as the ”arch enemy”. 
A similar finding was made by Schmidt (2016) in the articles of the German newspaper 
Frankfurter Allgemeine. Schmidt also found what he called a ”historic discourse” that 
was made up by themes like ”is Putin aiming for the creating a new Soviet” (2016). I 
chose not to have a specific frame for that, instead I let such threatening (implying that 
several countries would cease to be is a fair threat) speculations be part of the ”Putin is 
dangerous” frame. 
Assuming that being threatening is, in a way, an unflattering portrayal, we can conclude 
that HBL does so to a lesser degree than SvD, who is more likely to straight out assess 
him in a negative manner. The HBL reluctance could be interpreted as a sign of 
finlandisation, where it is tried to avoid being too outspoken in favour of keeping in 
favour with their much bigger neighbour. A possible reason for a Swedish newspaper so 
criticise him more publicly is that Sweden is a Moral Super Power (Dahl, 2006), and 
thus has a ”responsibility” to do so. 
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And a little bit crooked 
Putin is not often written about in contact with ”crooked things”, but his friends are. 
Sometimes it is implied that Putin is cut from the same cloth, but nothing can be 
proven so far, which is probably one reason why so few articles that mention a moral 
flexibility.  
Yet he sometimes strives for the greater good 
However, as much as Putin is crooked he also says he wants to make peace in different 
conflicts (Ngorno-Karabakh, Syria). The Peace maker frame was not found in any of the 
literature that is listed as Previous Research. Kangas et al. (2015) did not find him to 
be a peace maker during the Minsk negotiations, instead he was found to be guilty/
responsible, the arch enemy and the winner (Kangas et al., 2015.). 
This frame was not mentioned in any of the previous research, and more qualitative and 
quantitative research should be made to explore it further and evaluate its usefulness. 
Nevertheless, it shows that, sometimes, Putin gets another dimension in the texts.  
A sometime autocrat 
It does not happen often, but calling Putin an autocrat happens. It could be argued that 
that is a value laden statement. 
A very private president 
Not much is known about Vladimir Putin, other than the things he freely admitted to in 
his autobiography and things that he has been obliged to make public, such as his 
divorce (even if it took a very long time). Nevertheless it is interesting that nothing is 
mentioned of his current love life, his children or anything in that area. In comparison 
to the love life of many of the French presidential candidates, Anders Borg, Trump or 
even Sauli Niinistö, Putin’s life seems entirely barren of any sort of close bonds or 
anything that isn’t presidential. In that sense, the myth of Putin as some sort of super 
human with no need for petty things like the love, he also remains a manly man above 
the rest of us, an island with no need for anyone. Power is enough to make him 
successful and satisfied. Kangas et al. (2015) found that he was portrayed as a ”leader” 
in their data, and the same seems to be true here.  
This is a contrast to Schmidt’s findings where he found that Putin mostly was 
personalised in the text, and rarely was portrayed as his function, i.e. as the 
democratically elected head of state (2016). Could be a sign of the kind of 
personalisation that de Vreese et al. (2017) always push? 
!49
9.3 Comparing the Findings in HBL and SvD 
Looking at the third research question and the differences in the reporting made by the 
two news organisations, it seems like SvD is more prone to distinct proclamations than 
HBL. 
Looking at the main frames, they largely follow each other, apart from the Not 
applicable frame, where HBL is much more likely to use it as the Overall dominating 
Frame (23% vs. 12%). This could be because the East, and Putin is closer, mentally and 
geographically speaking in Finland, hence more reason to mention him in non-political 
instances as well.  
Proceeding to the sub frames, we suddenly have more nuances at our disposal. Vladimir 
Putin’s narrative role is to a large degree the same in the two newspapers, even if HBL 
is slightly more prone to having him as a main character than SvD. 
The idea of Putin as the Father of the country is such a rare occurrence that it is of no 
significance in both newspapers. Same is true for Putin the FSB agent. 
However, something very interesting happens when we move over to the frame ”Putin 
the dangerous”. Putin is coded as dangerous in 27% of the SvD articles, but only in 
8% of HBL’s texts. That is a big difference and is an aspect that could be examined 
further and more in depth in a later study. 
Putin is rarely described as a dictator, but when it happens it more often happens in the 
Swedish publication. The fact that SvD chose to call a democratically elected leader as 
such is interesting since several researchers argue that yes, the elections were tampered 
with, but Putin would have won regardless. 
Putin’s moral is largely viewed the same in both HBL and SvD, and Putin the 
peacemaker-frame is the same. However, it should be noted that Putin the peace maker 
is a slightly more common frame than Putin the dictator, though not by much. 
Putin’s private life does not occur often in neither publication. 
Lastly, looking at the direct assessments of Putin, we once more see the biggest 
difference between the two news organisations. SvD describes him with unfavourable 
words in 22% of the cases, and HBL in only 4% of them. To a certain degree, this 
corresponds to the findings of the sub frame Putin the Dangerous. In short, the biggest 
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difference between the two countries is that Sweden is more open about disliking Putin 
and finding him to be a dangerous character. 
This might hint at the Swedish tendency to pose as a moral super power, and the 
Finnish tendency towards Finlandisation where one cannot treat Russia like any other 
neighbouring country. 
9.4 Summary of Findings 
Largely, the findings made in the brief qualitative analysis point in the same direction as 
those found in the major quantitative analysis. Nevertheless, certain things ”popped” in 
these four texts. 
First of all, the similarities with the findings made by Kangas et al. (2015) become 
more obvious. This is interesting, considering that they focused on the images. This 
could indicate that excluding the images might have had a smaller impact on the results 
than first thought. This is good news for this study. 
The qualitative analysis also found certain frames that seemed to be pervasive also in 
Schmidt’s research (2016). Especially the personalisation discourse and the historical 
discourse were prominent. Next to none of the traits touted in Putin’s autobiography 
were found, indicating that the Russian idea of him and the Western idea of him differ 
from each other. 
The findings made by Goscilo (2013) are not entirely applicable, likely because they 
focused on findings in Russian media. Apparently, the way Russia writes about Putin 
differs from the way Nordic journalists do. 
It is also apparent how personal power is in many of the units, and how the 
publications enjoy emphasising his omnipresence/power. It also points towards the 
findings of de Vreese et al. and their finding that it is becoming increasingly common 
that newspapers, when writing about politics, talk about individuals instead of 
organisations, organs and structures (2017).  
Summarising the findings from the quantitative approach, this study shows that the game 
frame is the most popular frame to use overall, also during non-election times. The least 
popular frame is the issue frame. So far, all findings are in accordance with the findings 
of de Vreese et al. (2017). 
Putin is portrayed as a player by Goscilo et al., and De Vreese et al. found that the 
game frame is the most common news frame. Same is true here. Personalisation was 
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also found by Aelst et al. (2017) and is in part also found here, but since his private 
life rarely ever is mentioned, we can conclude that Putin is indeed personal, but not 
privateHowever, if we continue by looking at the separate ”aspects” of Putin found in 
these articles they only partially match with previous findings. The least match occurs, 
unsurprisingly with Putins autobiography. Not only is it the oldest text, but entirely 
subjective and uncritical on the whole..se the ideals of masculinity are ever changing, 
and differs vastly between Sweden, Finland and Russia. 
Another reason why the findings of this study not always matches with the findings of 
this book is, again, because the materials used for their studies are largely Russian, and 
thus have a much larger influence ”from above”, and the sky is not what is implied 
here. 
Moving on to what Schmidt (2016) found, there were no hard proof of the historic 
discourse in the quantitative analysis, but traces of it in the qualitative. This indicates 
that this discourse could be delved into further. Schmidt also found that the 
personalisation if the news was an important element in his findings. This became 
especially apparent in this study in the qualitative analysis of a select number of articles. 
Also, Schmidt found that Putin (and Russia) are dangerous and at war, which this study 
also caught. This study has focused less on the military aspect of Putin, but tangents it 
in the frame Putin as a leader, and this frame is not often reoccurring. 
Lastly, Kangas et al. (2015) found him to be (among other things) a leader, and 
aggressive, the arch enemy and winner. This also rings partly true in this study. If he is 
described as dangerous and aggressive in this study, the arch enemy fits, despite his 
morals rarely ever coming into question. Kangas et al. also found that Finnish 
publications put less emphasis than foreign ones on Russias role in the Crimean Crisis. 
Perhaps is the Swedish love for being more critical than Finland about Russia in 2016 a 
trace from this behaviour? 
What this does all of this mean for the study of Putin in Swedish and Finnish press in 
relation to previous research? That there seems to be a pattern in the West, but charting 
it is not done yet. 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10. Further Studies 
Researching an area that is A. political, and B. Russian is a recipe for uncertainty. The 
vast country’s political landscape is known for its rapid changes and the proceedings’ 
opaqueness until the very last moment. This means certain that ideas for future studies 
might not be possible when the time comes. Nevertheless, suggestions will be made 
below. 
First of all, a study of the massmedial coverage of the presidential election in 2018 is a 
given suggestion. This kind of study could be done both with Russian and foreign news 
sources, and a comparison between them is also an interesting possibility. If Alexei 
Navalny isn’t hindered from participating in it and Putin does not decide to retire early, 
it will likely be a massmedial carnival with excellent opportunity to see how the 
younger opponent and Putin will be framed in comparison, both visually and in the 
texts. This idea was suggested by undersigned already in 2015 (Thalén, 2015), but 
nevertheless it is still a relevant proposal. 
However, another suggestion for further studies is more ”general” studies, i.e not event 
specific (like Crimea or an election). Since Vladimir Putin is one of the longest sitting 
leaders of any super power there is also a golden opportunity to study changes and 
trends over time, both in Russia and abroad. It would be beneficial with more 
longitudinal research that allows us to delve deeper into the idea of Us and Him, of our 
idea of Russian politics and Putin. Preferable would be if this could be carried out in 
different countries so that it could be explored further what Putin ”is”, not only in 
countries such as the Nordics but also in other European countries that have been part 
of the Soviet union, for example. In order to fully understand the idea of Vladimir 
Vladimirovich Putin we must allow our findings of Putin’s portrayal to be polysemantic 
and slightly contradictory to begin with, until a critical mass has been reached and we 
can be entirely sure of the bigger patterns. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Coding Scheme 
Selected newspapers: Svenska Dagbladet, Hufvudstadsbladet. 
Time period: 01012016-31122016 
Selected texts: All chosen texts are from SvD and HBL and are accessible through the 
Swedish media archive Retriever. 
Unit of analysis: Complete articles, unless otherwise stated. 
This coding scheme is partly based on one created by Jesper Strömbäck in Väljarna, 
partierna och medierna (2009) in chapter 5. Den medialiserade valbevakningen. However, 
it has been changed and adapted to fit my own purposes and research questions better.  
1. Newspaper:________________ 
2. Code: ____________________ 
Election / Urval 
3. Frame in titel 
1. Issue frame 
2. Game frame 
3. Strategy frame 
4. Other 
5. Not applicable  
4. Frame in lead paragraph (ingress) 
1. Issue frame 
2. Game frame 
3. Strategy frame 
4. Other 
5. Not applicable 
5. Frame in body text 
1. Issue frame 
2. Game frame 
3. Strategy frame 
4. Other 
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5. Not applicable  
6. Dominating frame 
1. Issue frame 
2. Game frame 
3. Strategy frame 
4. Other 
5. Not applicable 
7. How is Putin used in the narrative? 
1. At length/as a major character in the text 
2. In passing/as a side character 
8. Are frames of Putin as a Father present? 
1. Yes  
2. No 
9. Is Putin The Man frame present? 
1. Yes  
2. No 
10. Is Putin the former FSB-agent frame present? 
1. Yes  
2. No 
11. Is Putin the aggressive/dangerous frame present? 
1. Yes  
2. No 
12. Is the Putin as a would-be dictator frame present? 
1. Yes  
2. No 
13. Is the Putin the morally questionable present? 
1. Yes  
2. No 
14. Is Putin the peace-maker frame present? 
1. Yes  
2. No 
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15. Is Putin as an individual fram present? 
1. Yes  
2. No 
16. How is Vladimir Putin judged? 
1. Favourably 
2. Unfavourably  
Code instructions 
1. Newspapers 
Every newspaper is given a number according to the following system: 
1. 100 - - Svenska Dagbladet 
2. 200 - - Hufvudstadsbladet 
2. Code 
Every article is given a number according to the following system: 
100 01, 100 02, etc. for Svenska Dagbladet, 
200 01, 200 02, etc. for Hufvudstadsbladet. 
Main frames 
3. Framing in title 
Title frames refer to frames found in the articles’ main title along with possible subtitles 
or sub headings. In the coding scheme there are Issue frame, Game frame and Strategy 
frame as alternatives. There are also Other and Not applicable. 
1. For the title to be coded as issue framed, it must mainly refer to objective (political) 
actions and decisions that have been made, such as Putin went to a summit, vetoed a 
new law or decided to dismantle the Duma. Political proposals, such as commentary on 
a new budget, participation in political events or meetings, any political views a person 
might express (such as, ”The EU is good/bad for us”) are all indicators of issue 
framing. 
2. The game frame in title refers to titles that focuses on how the political game is 
played. Who is winning and losing in politics in general (the rivalry between Putin 
and Obama, how do they ”play” each other), but also more specifically in elections, 
legislative debates or rising or sinking in the approval ratings. Speculations about 
outcomes also counts as game frames (for example who will win the election, whose 
policy will be more popular/get voted through, who will side with whom). Important 
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indicators that this frame is present is that sport or war terminology or metaphors is 
used, and words such as winners and losers. 
3. The strategy frame is used if the title is an interpretation of politics (why is this 
happening, what will this lead to and why is Putin acting like this) and politicians 
motives  for their actions, what means and tactics they use to get what they want, 
whatever it may be (usually policy or political goals). The strategy frame is also used if 
the title is about how someone campaigns. It also encompasses talk of media strategies, 
also taking into account coverage of press behaviour. If the title is about politicians as 
individuals rather than representatives for a political party it is too to be coded as 
strategy framing. 
 
4. Other refers to titles that don’t fit any of the frames mentioned above while there 
still is a connection to politics. 
 
5. Not applicable refers to titles that either don’t exist or lack any connection to 
politics. 
4. Frame in lead paragraph (ingress) 
”Lead paragraph” refers to the ”introduction paragraph” of the article. It is sometimes in 
bold. The alternatives are  the game frame, the issue fram and the strategy frame and 
other. Other is used if the frame does not fit one of the former, and not applicable is 
used in those instances where the text lacks a lead paragraph. 
5. Frame in body text 
Body text refers ro the ”text” in the article, i.e., with no regard to title, lead paragraph, 
etc. 
If no frame can be determined, the text should be coded as other. Not applicable is to 
be used in the unlikely event that the article lacks body text. 
6. Dominating frame 
Options: Issue frame, Game frame, Strategy frame, Other and Not applicable. Not 
applicable is to be used in the unlikely event that the text has no frames dominating 
frame, i.e., no frames have been found in the text. 
Here, the whole text is taken into consideration as a whole entity. In unclear or 
complicated cases special emphasis should be put on the title and the lead paragraph do 
settle the overall frame. 
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Sub frames 
The following variables refer to wether a frame is present or not. This means that they 
are coded based on their incidence. How dominating they are not taken into 
consideration and a text can thus contain multiple kinds of there frames. 
7. How is Putin used in the narrative? 
1. At length/as a major character in the text. Example: When he is the only person 
mentioned by  a name in the text or when the majority of the text pertains to him and 
his actions, wether it be commentary on them or through quotes directly from him. 
2. In passing. Example: name dropped when a Russian doping scandal is being brought 
to light during the Olympics or when Putin’s name is just one name among many listed 
as participating in a political event of some sort) 
8. Are frames of Putin as a Father present? 
1. Yes of the article in some way talks about Putin as a father figure for the nation  
(Отец Отечества). Example: articles where Putin is described with ”family terminology” 
or as a shepherd for the masses.  
2. No if he isn’t. 
9. Is Putin The Man frame present? 
1. Yes if Putin is portrayed as more manly that the average male, as aggressive or if 
the text alludes to his physique and athletic prowess. Also Yes if Putin is portrayed as 
sexually appealing to women (or men). This can happen through mentions of his 
popularity with any of the sexes, or comments pertaining to his looks. 
2. No if he isn’t, or if the comments about his appearance are negative. 
10. Is Putin the former FSB-agent frame present? 
1. Yes if the article mentions his former employment at the FSB, or his present/past 
close ties with the organisation. 
2. No if it does not. 
11. Is Putin the aggressive/dangerous frame present? 
1. Yes  if Putin is portrayed as (part of) the source of a high level of conflict or 
threating the text (he wants Russia to strengthen their nuclear arsenal, ”his” occupation 
of Ukraine or is declining peace talks). If the conflict is real or fabricated is of no 
consequence. If Putin openly criticises someone or something, it is to be coded as yes. 
This is also true for cases when his opinion is set against someone else’s view. If 
another person is quoted saying that Putin is an incendiary, or the journalist formulates 
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it should also be coded as a yes. 
2. No if the level of conflict is very low or absent. A low level of conflict could be a 
minor disagreement on a small issue that is of no importance to global happenings, 
peace talks or similar. (Minor tensions are often a requirement for something to register 
on the journalistic radar). 
12. Is the Putin as a would-be dictator frame present? 
1. Yes if the text says that he is striving for greater personal power or using 
undemocratic means to achieve something. Also yes if Putin is compared to previous 
political leaders that had the same tendency (Russian or any other nationality). Yes if 
Russia is called an autocracy or dictatorship, or he an autocrat/dictator. 
2. No if he isn’t. 
13. Is the Putin the morally questionable frame present? 
1. Yes if the article refers to alleged morally and legally dubious action such as 
corruption charges, mob/oligarch connections or other crimes that are tied to him on 
some manner. Also Yes if his political actions are portrayed as prompted by greed or 
illusions of grandeur. 
If the accusations are true or not is irrelevant. 
2. No if these things are not brought up. 
14. Is Putin the peace-maker frame present? 
1. Yes if Putin is portrayed as a stabilising force, as a voice of reason, or interested in 
cooperation with other countries to achieve peace or maintain good relations with another 
country. 
2. No if he isn’t. 
15. Is Putin as an individual frame present? 
1. Yes is the article discusses or mentions his private life. 
2. No if it doesn’t. 
16. How is Vladimir Putin judged? 
1. Favourably if he is described in mainly positive terms using flattering words and 
angles  in the article (such as ”he is a competent leader” or  ”he is a hero to his 
people”). 
2. Unfavourably if he is described with negative words and in an overall unflattering 
light (”he is single handedly ruingin relations with Europe and destroying the domestic 
policy reform”). 3. Vladimir Putin is to be coded as Neutral if both good (he has high 
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approval ratings) and bad (mentions of shady dealings with unsavoury individuals) are 
mentioned or if the descriptions of him are balanced in some other way. 
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Appendix 2
Result sheets 
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1. Svenska 
Dagbladet
2. Article 3. Frame in 
title
4. Frame in 
lead 
paragraph
5. Frame in 
body text
6. 
Dominating 
frame
7. 
Narrative 
role
8. Putin as 
the father 
of the 
country
9. Putin the 
Man
10. Putin 
the FSB-
agent
11. Putin 
the 
dangerous/
aggressive
12. Putin 
the dictator
13. Putin 
the morally 
questionabl
e
14. Putin 
the peace 
maker
15. Putin 
the person
16. How is 
Putin 
judged?
TOAL 
AMOUNT  
OF
1. Issue 
frame/Yes
2. Game 
frame /No
3. Strategy 
frame
4. Other
5. Not 
Applicable
10001 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
10002 2 2 3 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10003 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10004 4 5 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
10005 4 4 4 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10006 5 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10007 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10008 4 4 3 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
10009 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
10010 5 5 5 5 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
10011 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
10012 2 4 4 4 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
10013 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10014 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10015 4 3 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10016 1 1 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10017 1 1 4 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10018 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
10019 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10020 5 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
10021 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2
10022 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
10023 4 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
10024 1 1 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
10025 5 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
10026 5 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
10027 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10028 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10029 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 3
10030 4 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10031 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10032 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 3
10033 4 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10034 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10035 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 3
10036 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
10037 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
10038 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 3
10039 5 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10040 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10041 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1
10042 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2
10043 4 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10044 4 4 4 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
10045 4 4 4 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
10046 2 4 4 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
10047 4 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
10048 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
10049 4 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10050 4 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
10051 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3
10052 5 4 5 5 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
10053 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2
10054 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
10055 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10056 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
10057 4 4 3 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3
10058 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10059 5 4 1 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10060 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10061 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10062 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10063 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10064 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10065 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10066 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10067 5 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
7 8 7 6 17 1 1 2 18 3 6 3 0 5
17 20 23 27 50 66 66 65 49 64 61 64 67 15
0 4 10 5 47
26 23 19 21 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
17 12 8 8
67 67 67 67
 !65
1. 
Hufvudstad
sbladet
2. Article
3. Frame in 
title
4. Frame in 
lead 
paragraph
5. Frame in 
body text
6. 
Dominating 
frame
7. 
Narrative 
role
8. Putin as 
the Father 
of the 
country
9. Putin the 
Man
10. Putin 
the FSB-
agent
11. The 
dangerous/
aggressive
12. Putin 
the dictator
13. Putin 
the morally 
questionabl
e
14. Putin 
the peace 
maker
15. Putin 
the Person
16. How is 
Putin 
judged?
TOAL 
AMOUNT  
OF
1. Issue 
frame/Yes
2. Game 
frame /No
3. Strategy 
frame
4. Other
5. Not 
Applicable
20001 5 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20002 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20003 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20004 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20005 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20006 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20007 5 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20008 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
20009 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20010 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20011 4 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20012 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20013 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
20014 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20015 4 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20016 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20017 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20018 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20019 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10020 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 3
10021 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10022 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
10023 1 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10024 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10025 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10026 5 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10027 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
10028 4 4 4 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10029 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 3
10030 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
10031 2 5 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20032 2 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20033 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20034 5 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20035 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20036 5 5 5 5 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
20037 5 5 5 5 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3
20038 1 4 4 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 3
20039 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20040 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 3
20041 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20042 3 4 4 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20043 4 4 3 3 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3
20044 5 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3
20045 4 4 4 4 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20046 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 3
20047 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 3
20048 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
20049 3 1 3 3 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
5 8 3 4 10 0 0 1 4 1 4 3 1 1
10 11 17 16 39 49 49 48 45 48 45 46 48 2
3 2 4 4 46
16 16 13 14
15 12 11 11
49 49 48 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49 49
Appendix 3 
List of articles coded 
> "Att utvisa hade varit väntat", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-31 
> Nya aktörer styr i Syrienspelet, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-30 
> Sorgedag utlyst efter flygkrasch, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-26 
> Donald Trump: "Låt det bli kapprustning", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-24 
> MÖRDAD AMBASSADÖR BEGRAVD, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-23 
> Polisbricka öppnade väg för mördaren, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-21 
> Blodiga dåd spelar populister rätt i händerna, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-21 
> Obama: Nätattackerna oroar mig, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-17 
> Vi lever i en amerikansk rysare med osäkert slut, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-15 
> Varför blev Putin president?, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-11 
> Rysk aktivist åter i rätten, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-07 
> Putin markerar mot "vänner", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-02 
> Putin utser ny minister, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-12-01 
> Fransk "Thatcher" nu kandidat i presidentval, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-28 
> V ser hopp i det sänkta ryska försvarsanslaget, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-24 
> Konservativ uppbackning för Trump, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-19 
> Ryskt statligt stöd till bilbranschen, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-16 
> Motstånd mot gasledning kan stödja Ukrainas sak, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-15 
> Öst mot väst i Moldaviens val, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-12 
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> Är undergången här?, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-06 
> Trump har redan vunnit, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-11-03 
> Le Pen lånar miljoner av arabvärlden till kampanj, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-10-27 
> Isig relation kan tina en grad, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-10-15 
> Svensk splittring om kärnvapen, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-10-11 
> Barnen är isvindarnas offer, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-10-05 
> Ännu en storm för skandalernas man, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-10-01 
> Avlidne Peres hyllas av många, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-09-29 
> Folkomröstning hotar Bosniens väg mot EU, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-09-24 
> Storseger men apatin växer, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-09-20 
> Danmark nobbar rysk Arktis-invit, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-09-13 
> Ökat tryck på regeringen stoppa ny rysk gasledning, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-09-09 
> Abe och Putin vill sluta fred, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-09-04 
> Plötslig rysk militärövning, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-08-26 
> Fyra nya namn och en nyvunnen vänskap, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-08-15 
> Putin och Erdogan överens, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-08-10 
> Efter alla skandaler - avgörandet är här, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-08-01 
> "Trump i samma falang som Le Pen och Putin", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-07-29 
> Städernas Fågel Fenix är full av kulturskatter, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-07-27 
> Wada-rapport bekräftar ryskt fusk, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-07-19 
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> "Man vill skrämma obekväma röster", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-07-10 
> Björklund vill se ett starkare EU, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-07-04 
> Dags att spela schack mot populismen, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-06-30 
> Blandade känslor för brexit i USA, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-06-25 
> Jimmie Åkesson och Putin - bögarnas bästa vänner, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-06-19 
> "Putins makt är beundransvärd", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-06-17 
> Bättre relation till Kreml dröjer, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-06-06 
> Natoambitioner retar Ryssland, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-05-16 
> Putin vill säkra dubbelseger, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-05-09 
> Putin tar ett stort steg mot mer makt i rymden, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-04-30 
> Fängslad pilot kan bytas mot ryska soldater, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-04-20 
> Skatteskandalen pressar politiker, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-04-12 
> "Det var fantastiskt då jag, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-04-08 
> Strider trots eldupphör i Nagorno-Karabach, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-04-04 
> Oredans tid är här, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-03-28 
> Alla ombord omkom vid krasch i snöstorm, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-03-20 
> "Psykologiskt spel av Putin", Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-03-16 
> I Ryssland är missnöje förenat med livsfara, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-03-11 
> Rojalistisk yra även i Ryssland, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-03-04 
> TUSENTALS RYSSAR, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-02-28 
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> Rysk militär pekas ut för nedskjutning, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-02-25 
> På Östersjön går politikens vågor höga, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-02-09 
> Turkiet: Ny rysk flygkränkning, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-01-31 
> Skakigt inför fredssamtal, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-01-25 
> Ryska rubeln rasar i takt med oljan, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-01-22 
> Kina i fokus när mäktiga minglar, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-01-19 
> Utbetalningen till KI-kirurg stoppas, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-01-09 
> Spår i sanden var det enda som blev kvar, Svenska Dagbladet, 2016-01-06 
> Jörn Donners Finland är rikt och veligt, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-12-31 
> ”Ingen trodde att Trump skulle vinna - förutom vi”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-12-24 
> Över 70 har dött av badoljan i Sibirien, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-12-23 
> ”Olika åsikt om Ryssland hindrar inte militärt samarbete”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 
2016-12-18 
> Pragmatism bakom Trumps ryska giv, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-12-15 
> Dags att stänga av Ryssland, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-12-10 
> Upplagt för fransk chock, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-11-29 
> Rysslandsforskare och rysk diplomat rök ihop i riksdagen, Hufvudstadsbladet, 
2016-11-24 
> Ärkekonservativa klara för Trumpjobb, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-11-19 
> EU:s enighet testas, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-11-16 
> Bulgarien får Rysslandsvänlig president, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-11-15 
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> ”Amerikanska folket vill samma sak som Putin”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-11-10 
> Clinton nytt hopp för splittrat USA, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-10-30 
> Bombstoppet i Aleppo ser ut att hålla, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-10-20 
> ”Finland ska vara redo för hackares attacker inför presidentvalet”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 
2016-10-13 
> MILITÄR ”Ryssland uppviglas av andras svaghet”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-10-03 
> Avlidne Shimon Peres hyllas brett, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-09-29 
> FN-chefen anklagar syriska regimen, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-09-21 
> Diane James ny ledare för Ukip, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-09-17 
> Obama och Putin möttes i Kina, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-09-06 
> Kritik mot rysk stjärndirigent, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-08-28 
> Otto var som vanligt upprörd, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-08-18 
> Ryssland Putin anklagar Ukraina för ”terror på Krim”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-08-11 
> Vegas sommarpratare Fred skämtar om Åland, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-08-05 
> Civilsamhället måste kräva ett slut på det militära maktspelet, Hufvudstadsbladet, 
2016-07-16 
> Lämplig balans i relationerna, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-07-12 
> Trump och Putin oroar Sveriges försvarsminister, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-07-05 
> Putin sade fel och så är det med den saken, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-07-03  
> Turkiet Turkiet värmer upp relationer till Ryssland och Israel, Hufvudstadsbladet, 
2016-06-29 
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> Nyanserande samtal, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-06-27 
> Ett spel för gallerierna, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-06-19 
> EM Putin Rysslands trumfkort, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-06-12 
> Österbottens Tidning, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-06-09 
> Sakkunskapen måste avgöra, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-06-01 
> Nykomlingen utmanar ringräven, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-05-28 
> Problemet med den ryska mentaliteten, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-05-09 
> Köp av hampfrön kan leda till registeranteckning, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-04-29 
> Putin kritiserade Turkiet i frågestund, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-04-15 
> Management by perkele har de, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-04-10 
> Rapporter om strid trots eldupphör, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-04-04 
> Fennovoima är en del av den ryska strategin, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-03-24 
> Putin skyller på myndigheterna, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-03-17 
> Icke-allierade är vi inte, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-03-06 
> ”De slåss mot en död människa”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-02-26 
> Syrien Obama till Putin: Sluta bomba, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-02-15 
> Putins gökunge i Groznyj, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-02-04 
> ”Putin godkände troligen mordet”, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-01-22 
> IAAF-ledningen hjälpte doparna att komma undan, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-01-15 
 
> Ryssland BBC: Nato hot i rysk säkerhetsstrategi, Hufvudstadsbladet, 2016-01-02  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Appendix 4 
Units chosen for close-reading  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16 Lördag 24 december 2016HUFVUDSTADSBLADET
Nyheter
 – Jag har i dag talat i telefon med 
min italienske kollega. Han har per-
sonligen bekräftat för mig att den 
ihjälskjutne personen är samma per-
son som den misstänkte gärnings-
mannen i dådet på julmarknaden på 
Breitscheidplatz, säger Tysklands in-
rikesminister Thomas de Maizière 
på en presskonferens.
Enligt italienska medier blev tu-
nisiern Anis Amri stoppad i en rutin-
kontroll på Piazza I Maggio, efter att 
ha anlänt med tåg till stationen Sesto 
San Giovanni i norra Milano.
– Han öppnade omedelbart eld 
med en pistol, och den italienska po-
lisen sköt då ihjäl honom. Italienska 
myndigheter har redan gjort en jäm-
förelse av fingeravtrycken och kun-
de på så vis fastställa identiteten, sä-
ger Thomas de Maizière.
Utvisa fl er
Det de Maizière kallar ”framgång i 
utredningen” har inte ändrat hotni-
vån, som är fortsatt hög i Tyskland, 
förklarar han.
– Nu när denne terrorist inte läng-
re utgör en fara, är tiden inne att pra-
ta om konsekvenser. Jag kommer in-
om kort att ha ett samtal med min 
kollega (Tysklands justitieminister) 
Maas om detta, säger han.
Tysklands förbundskansler Ang-
ela Merkel säger på en pressträff att 
en rad nödvändiga åtgärder nu ska 
vidtas för att snabbt stärka säkerhe-
ten i landet. En sådan åtgärd är att 
öka antalet personer som utvisas 
från landet när de har fått avslag på 
sin asylansökan, enligt Reuters.
Merkel har också framfört just så-
dana krav till Tunisien.
– Jag sade till Tunisiens president 
att vi måste snabba på deportering-
arna och öka antalet personer som 
skickas tillbaka, säger hon på press-
träffen.
Trohet till IS
I en video som har lagts upp på nätet 
av IS propagandakanal Amaq svär 
Anis Amri trohet till terrorgruppen 
och uppmanar till hämnd och at-
tacker mot ”korsfararna” i Europa, 
uppger Reuters.
Amri befann sig bara timmar ef-
ter attentatet utanför en ökänd mos-
ké i Berlin, visar övervakningsfilmer 
som public service-kanalen Rund-
funk Berlin-Brandenburg (RBB) har 
tagit del av. Bönelokalen på Perleber-
ger Strasse i norra Berlin är ett känt 
tillhåll för sympatisörer till Islamis-
ka staten (IS). Amri ska även ha va-
rit på platsen vid minst två tillfällen 
förra veckan, 15 och 16 december.
Enligt tyska nyhetssajter fanns 
det inga underrättelseuppgifter om 
att han därefter sökt sig till Italien.
Fler bevis
I takt med att polisutredningen fort-
skrider pekar alltfler bevis mot Am-
ri. I lastbilen som användes vid at-
tacken mot julmarknaden på Breit-
scheidplatz fanns en handling i hans 
namn. Dessutom har hans finger-
avtryck hittats i förarhytten. Enligt 
Thomas de Maizière är det ställt 
bortom rimligt tvivel att Anis Amri 
har befunnit sig i lastbilen.
Tidigt i torsdags morse slog spe-
cialenheter inom polisen till mot tre 
adresser i Berlin: en lägenhet på Ly-
chener Strasse i Prenzlauer Berg, 
en annan på Grossbeerenstrasse i 
Kreuzberg och moskén i Moabit, 
rapporterar RBB. Insatsen ledde 
dock inte till några gripanden.
Anis Amri hade stått under bevak-
ning i Tyskland sedan i mars. Lan-
dets säkerhetstjänster kände till att 
han varit i kontakt med ledande sala-
fister och han misstänktes ha plane-
rat ett rån för att finansiera vapen-
Berlinmisstänkt 
svor trohet till IS
Terrorism Mannen som jagats i hela Europa för julmarknadsdådet 
i Berlin sköts ihjäl i Milano. I en video som IS propagandakanal har 
 publicerat svär Anis Amri trohet till terrorgruppen.
ÖPPNADE ELD. Den misstänkte 
Berlinterroristen Anis Amri sköts 
till döds i en eldstrid med polisen i 
Milano. Amri sköt först mot polisen.  
Här döljer polisen och kriminaltekni-
kerna Amris kropp från nyfi kna för-
bipasserandes blickar. FOTO: LEHTIKUVA 
Vladimir Putins årliga presskonfe-
rens brukar vara en blandning av 
show, information och buskis. Ofta 
har Putin tagit tillfället i akt att ge-
nera kvinnliga journalister eller låta 
undslippa sig någon smaklös spets-
fundighet. 
I fjol såg vi en president i försvars-
ställning promenera in. 
I år är det snarare en person som 
verkar se fram emot att få säga till 
den västerländska pressen: Vad var 
det jag sa. 
I fjol lät han nästan bara rysk re-
gional press ställa frågor, nu släpp-
te han fram både Wall Street Jour-
nal, BBC och NBC och höll på i över 
fyra timmar, en timme längre än sist. 
Över 1 400 journalister hade ackre-
diterat sig.
Det är svårt att låta bli att dra slut-
satsen att valet av Donald Trump – 
och Trumps val av ministrar – har 
gjort Putin betydligt villigare att mö-
ta den internationella pressen. 
Belåtet leende
På frågan om den ryska inblandning-
en i amerikanska presidentvalet sva-
rar Putin först så här:
– Det är meningslöst att skylla 
sina egna misslyckanden på utom-
stående faktorer. Republikanerna 
är i majoritet även i senaten. Är det 
också vårt fel? En betydande del av 
det amerikanska folket har en syn 
på hur världen ska styras som sam-
manfaller med vår. Det är en bra 
grund för att bygga relationer mel-
lan två mäktiga länder som USA och 
Ryssland. 
Sedan tillägger Putin:
– USA har fått en president som 
kände av strömningarna i samhäl-
let. Ingen trodde att han skulle vin-
na. Förutom vi. 
Publiken skrattar. Applåderar. 
Och Putins belåtna leende säger mer 
än tusen ord. 
Det här är något som Putin ex-
cellerar i – att säga en sak utåt men 
samtidigt signalera att han kanske 
har gjort exakt det han anklagas för. 
Men det går inte att bevisa. Det är ett 
maktmedel, ett sätt att visa att man 
har övertaget. Putin använde sam-
ma taktik när Ryssland annektera-
de Krim.
– Precis som Trump sade: Ingen 
vet vem som hackade in sig hos De-
”Ingen trodde att Trump skulle vinna   – förutom vi”
ALLA BLICKAR PÅ PRESIDENTEN. I år höll Putin på i över fyra timmar på sin årliga presskonferens. Över 1 400 jour-
nalister hade ackrediterat sig. FOTO: AFP / LEHTIKUVA/NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA
ANALYS
Vladimir Putin gav ett avspänt 
och säkert intryck under sin år-
liga gigantiska presskonferens 
i Moskva. Han antydde med ett 
leende att han tidigt förstod att 
Donald Trump skulle vinna pre-
sidentvalet i USA. 
ANNA-LENA LAURÉN
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SVERIGE – Det har brustit i nästan 
allt, konstaterar utredaren Sten 
Heckscher.
Karolinska institutet (KI) är med-
ansvarigt till att det experimentera-
des med konstgjorda luftstrupar på 
svårt sjuka patienter. Dessutom an-
ställdes kirurgen, och fick sin an-
ställning förlängd, under ytterst 
olämpliga former. Det visar en ex-
tern utredning som pekar på en rad 
allvarliga brister i hur KI hanterat 
Macchiarini-ärendet.
– Det har brustit i nästan allt. Från 
hur man har hanterat ärenden till att 
de inte har iakttagit grundläggande 
förvaltningsrättsliga regler. Det he-
la är väldigt slarvigt, säger utreda-
ren Sten Heckscher.
Någon anställningsintervju ge-
nomfördes aldrig och några referen-
ser var det inte tal om. Detta trots att 
det fanns mycket tydliga varnings-
signaler från Macchiarinis tidigare 
arbetsgivare.
– Jag har anställt folk i hela mitt 
liv och jag har aldrig, i något ären-
de, sett maken till negativa referen-
ser. Macchiarini saknar omdömde, 
bryr sig inte om etiska tillstånd eller 
att skapa team och rent allmänt är 
han hypoman. Minst. KI fick denna 
information, men den följdes aldrig 
upp. I så fall hade han nog aldrig an-
ställts, säger Sten Heckscher.
Eftersatt kultur
Inte ens när Macchiarinis förord-
nande skulle förlängas tre år senare, 
var det någon som reagerade. Dess-
utom, visar utredningen, fanns en 
flagrant arrogans från institutets si-
da mot lagar och regler.
– Det är en nonchalans mot reg-
ler och processer som upprepas på 
punkt efter punkt och det är allvar-
ligt. Förvaltningskulturen på KI ver-
kar eftersatt, säger Sten Heckscher.
Hittills har Macchiarini-ärendet 
resulterat i att rektorn avgått och så 
sent som i fredags meddelade insti-
tutets styrelseordförande, Lars Lei-
jonborg, att även han kastar in hand-
duken.
– Det är ett stort förändringsarbe-
te som nu ska dras igång. Jag skul-
le ändå sluta i april och det är bätt-
re om en och samma person får va-
ra med under hela den här resan, sä-
ger Lars Leijonborg.
TT: Vilket ansvar har du för det som 
har hänt?
– Vår förvaltningskultur bygger 
mycket på tillit. Vi har en delega-
tionsordning där systemet bygger på 
att varje befattningshavare tar sitt 
ansvar. Andra personer i det här dra-
mat har fått varningssignaler som 
de har valt att bortse ifrån, men jag 
upplever inte att vi i styrelsen fått 
det. För mig är det exempelvis helt 
ofattbart hur rekryteringen gick till, 
säger Lars Leijonborg.
Heckscher, däremot, tycker att 
Leijonborgs avgång är ”oansvarig”:
– Han skulle ha kunnat ta sitt an-
svar bättre genom att stanna på job-
bet och leda arbetet med att föränd-
ra KI. Det är en illa vald tidpunkt. 
FNB–TT-JOHAN NILSSON/CARL CATO 
Karolinska 
struntade  
i regelverken 
UTREDS. Karolinska Institutet står som medansvariga för experimenterandet med konstgjorda luftstrupar som kirurgen Paolo Macchiarini (bilden) utfört, 
visar Sten Heckschers utredning. FOTO: EPA/CARLO FERRARO.
Karolinska institutets hantering av 
Macchiarini-ärendet genomsyras av slarv  
och nonchalans mot lagar och regler.
FAKTA
Flera utredningar
●● Det pågår ett tiotal utred-
ningar kring kirurgen Pao-
lo Macchiarinis verksamhet i 
Sverige.
●● Förra veckan presenterade 
utredaren Kjell Asplund, pro-
fessor emeritus och före detta 
generaldirektör för Socialsty-
relsen, en utredning av Mac-
chiarinis kliniska verksamhet 
vid Karolinska universitets-
sjukhuset. Denna utredning 
visade att sjukhuset brustit i 
ansvar på ett flertal allvarliga 
punkter.
●● Under måndagen presen-
teras en utredning av Karo-
linska institutets agerande. 
Denna utredning leds av Sten 
Heckscher, före detta ordfö-
rande för Högsta förvaltnings-
domstolen.
●● I februari avgick institu-
tets dåvarande rektor, Anders 
Hamsten, till följd av turerna 
kring Paolo Macchiarini. 
Källa: Kjell Asplund och Karolin-
ska institutet
❞ Jag har anställt folk i hela mitt liv och jag har aldrig, 
i något ärende, sett 
maken till negativa 
referenser. Macchia-
rini saknar omdömde, 
bryr sig inte om etiska 
tillstånd eller att skapa 
team och rent allmänt 
är han hypoman. 
Minst. KI fick denna 
information, men den 
följdes aldrig upp. I så 
fall hade han nog aldrig 
anställts. 
Sten Heckscher,  
utreder Macchiarini-ärendet.
USA:s och Rysslands 
presidenter förde enskilda 
förhandlingar under en och  
en halv timme i samband med 
G20-toppmötet i Kina i går.
KINA Barack Obama och Vladimir Pu-
tin diskuterade bland annat Syrien, 
och Obama sade att diskussionerna 
varit raka och konstruktiva.
Det kan ha varit sista gången som 
Obama, som lämnar presidentpos-
ten vid årsskiftet, och Putin träffades.
Enligt Vita huset gick presiden-
terna inte in på detaljer utan ansva-
ret för dem ligger på utrikesminist-
rarna. USA och Ryssland har försökt 
nå samförstånd för att få slut på stri-
derna i Syrien så att bland annat ci-
vila i Aleppo kan få humanitär hjälp.
– Om ett avtal kan nås vill vi nå 
det så fort som möjligt, med tan-
ke på den humanitära situationen. 
Men vi måste också försäkra oss om 
att det blir ett fungerande avtal, sa-
de en informatör vid Vita huset.
Strax innan presidenterna möt-
tes ska utrikesministrarna John 
Kerry och Sergej Lavrov ha avslu-
tat sina förhandlingar utan resultat. 
Ministrarna lär träffas igen inom de 
närmaste dagarna.
Ryssland stöder enväldiga presi-
denten Bashar al-Assads styrkor i 
kriget medan USA ställt sig bakom 
de oppositionella som strider mot 
Assad. 
Stormakternas gemensamma 
fiende är terrororganisationen 
IS. FNB–AFP 
Obama och Putin möttes i Kina
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Putin vill säkra dubbelseger
– Putin säger att det inte finns 
någon diskriminering mot hbtq-
personer i Ryssland. Man vill 
locka Europa med Sergej Laza-
revs låt ”You’re the only one”.  
      Det säger Tatjana Vinnitjen-
ko, ordförande för Hbtq Ryss-
land inför Eurovisionfinalen.
Sergej Lazarev kallas för Lazer 
Boy och är en av Rysslands popu-
läraste artister just nu. I morgon 
framträder han i första semifina-
len, och på lördag kan han med 
den favorittippade låten ”You are 
the only one” säkra Rysslands 
vinst i Eurovisionsfinalen.
– Han sjunger ”du”, och syftar 
inte på en ”hon” i den engelsk-
språkiga versionen. På ryska 
sjunger han om en tjej, han ska 
tilltala kvinnor, säger Olga Bara-
nova, ansvarig för Hbtq Ryss-
lands Moskvaregion.
Olga Baranova menar att låten 
har översatts på ett strategiskt 
sätt för att locka den schlager-
intresserade gayvärlden utanför 
Ryssland. Men i Ryssland mark-
nadsförs Lazarev som en sexsym-
bol för kvinnor.
– Det passar den ryska publi-
ken bättre. Det skvallras om att 
han är gay eller queer men det är 
omöjligt att veta.
En seger i Eurovisionsfinalen 
innebär att det vinnande landet 
får vara värdland för nästa års 
tävling. Om Ryssland vinner blir 
det i så fall första gången sedan 
de nya striktare anti-gaylagarna 
infördes – som likställer hbtq-
symboler med propaganda.
Införandet av lagen om ”homo-
sexuell propaganda” år 2013 
innebar även att främjandet av så 
kallade ”icke-traditionella sexu-
ella relationer” förbjöds.
Enligt Tatjana Vinnitjenko, 
ordförande för Hbtq Ryssland, 
pågår en trend som innebär att 
även mindre framgångar, till ex-
empel i Eurovision, kan vara nyt-
tiga för hur Ryssland uppfattas i 
andra länder.
– President Vladimir Putin 
bryr sig om att vinna. Genom 
 Lazarev vill man locka Europa till 
Ryssland, säger Tatjana Vinni-
tjenko, och fingrar på sitt regn-
bågsfärgade halsband.
Att hbtq-personer skulle vara 
diskriminerade är en känslig frå-
ga, menar hon.
– Putin säger att det inte finns 
någon diskriminering mot hbtq-
personer i Ryssland. Han menar 
inte att Lazarev är gay, men vin-
ner han kommer segern att an-
vändas som en symbol för att visa 
att situationen för homosexuella 
är okej.
Samtidigt tror Tatjana Vinni-
tjenko att om Ryssland vinner så 
kommer man att försöka tvätta 
bort likhetstecknet mellan gay-
världen och spektaklet som om-
ger Eurovision.
Vad betyder Lazarevs framgång-
ar för hbtq-rörelsen i Ryssland?
– Uppmärksamheten är bra 
om den riktas mot hbtq-perso-
ners utsatthet. Men det är svårt 
att förutse. Om aktivister protes-
terar kan de bli fängslade i sam-
band med evenemanget, säger 
Olga Baranova.
Tatjana Vinni tjenko menar 
däremot att det inte kommer att 
vara några officiella problem för 
gayvärlden att komma till Ryss-
land.
– Myndigheter kommer att 
säga att man vill att fansen ska 
vara här. Men de ska inte skylta 
med att de är gay. Symboler som 
de viftar med i sina hemländer 
kommer de inte kunna visa öp-
pet, säger Tatjana.
Regnbågsflaggor och andra så 
kallade ”homosexuella” symbo-
ler är förbjudna i Ryssland. De 
betecknas som propaganda och 
kan leda till att personer fängs-
las om symbolerna bärs offent-
ligt, i synnerhet vid demonstra-
tioner.
Vid en eventuell rysk seger – hur 
kan fans som beskriver sig som 
gay känna sig trygga i Moskva 
nästa år?
– Hbtq-personer kommer att 
resa till Moskva om det blir en 
rysk seger, men de kan inte ut-
trycka sig på samma sätt som 
hemma. Det handlar inte bara 
om symboler, man kan inte kan 
hålla varandra i handen. Ingen 
ska behöva riskera att bli nedsla-
gen i tunnelbanan, säger Tatjana 
Vinni tjenko.
En sak kan man vara säker på. 
Om Eurovision hålls i Ryssland 
nästa år blir det en imponerande 
show. Finalen 2009 på Olympia-
stadion i Moskva har gått till his-
torien om en av de dyraste i täv-
lingens historia.
Sergej Lazarev är omåttligt 
 populär i Ryssland. Enligt medie-
uppgifter har han sagt att Euro-
vision Song Contest symboliserar 
internationell harmoni. Han be-
skriver tävlingen som en fristad 
där man kan uttrycka sig fritt 
oavsett sin religion eller sexuella 
läggning.
MARIA GEORGIEVA
maria.georgieva@svd.se
Sergej Lazarev, Rysslands ”Lazer Boy”, kan ta hem en symboliskt viktig seger – som också kommer att bli en propagandaseger för president Putin. FOTO: CLAUDIO BRESCIANI/TT 
Grekland har  
”i princip”  
nått målen för 
 reformerna.
EU-kommissionens ordförande 
Jean-Claude Juncker till tyska 
 medier inför dagens möte i Bryssel, 
där eurogruppen möts för att dis-
kutera möjliga skuldlättnader.  
”Svårt att tämja 
elden i Kanada
Skogsbranden i Kanada har dri-
vit hundratusentals människor 
på flykt och det kan dröja måna-
der innan den är under kontroll. 
500 brandmän sliter med att be-
gränsa eldens framfart, vissa av 
dem har jobbat i 40 timmar i 
sträck för att släcka ”besten”, som 
branden döpts till i medierna. 
Lågorna har slukat 200 000 kva-
dratkilometer, en yta stor som 
två tredjedelar av Gotland. TT
Åtta egyptiska 
poliser dödade
Åtta civilklädda poliser har dö-
dats i en attack av oidentifierade 
män, beväpnade med automat-
vapen, söder om Kairo. Männen 
ska ha klivit ur en liten pickup, 
stoppat polisbilen, överöst den 
med kulor och sedan flytt. Ter-
rororganisationen IS tar på sig 
attentatet, uppger AFP. IS och 
andra jihadistgrupper har dödat 
flera hundra poliser och soldater 
de senaste åren.  TT-REUTERS
73 dog i afghansk 
bussolycka
Minst 73 personer har dödats i 
en olycka i Afghanistan där två 
bussar krockade med en tankbil, 
uppger hänvisar hälsodeparte-
mentet enligt AFP. Olyckan 
 inträffade i provinsen Ghazni  
i östra Afghanistan.
Alla tre fordonen började 
brinna efter krocken som skedde 
på huvudvägen mellan huvud-
staden Kabul och staden Kanda-
har i söder.  TTFOTO: JONATHAN HAYWARD/AP
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VI FÖLJER INTE,  
VI LEDER
DAIKIN VÄRMEPUMPAR
Daikin Ururu Sarara R35 är bäst i test!   Bäst resultat i KVI:s test av luftvärme-
pumpar (okt 2016) fick Daikins Ururu Sarara R35, som även fick högsta poäng  
i Folksams test och belönades med Bra Val 2015 och 2016. Detta mycket tack  
vare R32 som köldmedium, som både är framtidssäkert och mer miljövänligt.  
Läs mer på daikin.se/testvinnare
Ururu Sarara R35 är ett högpresterande flaggskepp från Daikin med den högsta  
verkningsgraden och bästa effekten av alla. Ururu Sarara R35 är inte bara en otroligt 
bra luftvärmepump, den är ett komplett klimatsystem som renar, ventilerar,  
befuktar och avfuktar efter behov.
Världsledande Daikin utmanar med teknik,  
funktion och trygghet långt över det vanliga.  
Läs mer om Daikins produktutbud, garantier och 
hitta närmaste återförsäljare på www.daikin.se
ccj
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FÖRBEREDD FÖR  
STYRNING  
VIA WIFI
Det var ju det vi sa:  Vi följer inte, vi leder!
8 ÅRS
BÄST I TEST! 
KVI:S TEST AV VÄRMEPUMPAR OKT 2016
Daikin – när du vill ha det bästa
20XX
V ser hopp i det sänkta  
ryska försvarsanslaget
Vänsterpartiets försvarspolitiske 
talesperson Stig Henriksson 
tycker att det är hoppfullt att 
Ryssland aviserar att man kom-
mer att kraftigt minska ansla-
gen till försvaret de kommande 
åren, och hoppas att kapprust-
ningen nu kan brytas. Hans Wall-
mark, försvarspolitisk talesper-
son för Moderaterna, tvivlar 
dock på de ryska siffrorna.
Enligt den ryska regeringens 
budgetförslag kommer försvars-
anslagen nästa år utgöra 3,3 pro-
cent av Rysslands BNP, vilket SvD 
avslöjade i går. Det är en kraftig 
minskning jämfört med årets 
siffror, där försvarsbudgeten ut-
gör 4,7 procent av BNP.
Sedan president Vladimir Putin 
inledde upprustningen av försva-
ret för snart tio år sedan har an-
slagen aldrig tidigare minskat. 
Den ryska regeringen tvingas 
nästa år göra nedskärningar på 
grund av sitt budgetunderskott, 
enligt Rysslandskännaren och 
före detta överstelöjtnanten Jör-
gen Elfving.
Stig Henriksson, försvarspoli-
tisk talesperson för Vänsterpar-
tiet, hoppas budgetförslaget kan 
bryta kapprustningen mellan 
Ryssland och Väst.
– Att man nu tvingats bromsa 
sin uppbyggnad hoppas jag kan 
vara starten för att den oroande 
rustnings- och övningsspiralen 
i vårt närområde kan brytas, sä-
ger han.
Han menar att den ryska upp-
rustningen sedan millenieskiftet 
är oroande. Men samtidigt ska 
man komma ihåg att det ryska 
försvaret kraftigt nedmonterades 
efter Sovjetunionens fall, menar 
Stig Henriksson.
– Det är ju därför till och med 
Saudiarabien har en större mili-
tärbudget än Ryssland.
Hans Wallmark, försvarspoli-
tisk talesperson för Modera-
terna, är inte lika hoppfull om 
den ryska förvarsbudgeten. Han 
ser inget tecken på en minskad 
rysk upprustning, och menar att 
budgetförslaget kan vara miss-
visande.
– Jag har inga indikationer på 
att Ryssland skruvar ner sina am-
bitioner. Det är fortsatta upprust-
nings- och reformeringsprogram 
när det gäller försvarsmakten. 
Det krävs mer än att man ordnar 
den här typen av budgetredovis-
ning, säger han.
Han ger inte heller mycket för 
Stig Henrikssons påpekande om 
det ryska försvaret under 1990- 
talet.
– Om Vänsterpartiet vill ägna 
sig åt att bortförklara rysk upp-
rustning så får det stå för dem, 
säger han.
Hans Wallmark säger att hans 
källor menar att den ryska 
aggressiviteten fortsätter, bland 
annat genom rysk underrättelse-
verksamhet i Europa, provokatio-
ner kring Östersjön och desinfor-
mation.
– Det försämrade beteendet 
trollas inte bort med en budget-
post eller två, säger han.
SvD har sökt försvarsminister 
Peter Hultqvist (S) för en kom-
mentar.
PER KUDO
per.kudo@svd.se
Om Vänster-
partiet vill ägna 
sig åt att bort-
förklara rysk 
upprustning så 
får det stå för 
dem.
Hans Wallmark, M:s försvars- 
politiske talesperson
” 
Putin tvingas till kraftig  
sänkning av militärutgifter
SvD.se  1
Trippelmördare 
kan ställas inför 
rätta i Libanon
Livstidsdömde trippelmördaren 
Martin Saliba som flydde från 
Sverige innan domen avkunna-
des kan komma att dömas enligt 
libanesisk lag.
   – Offrens familjer kan kräva  
öga för öga – tand för tand, säger 
islamologen Jan Hjärpe till SVT 
Nyheter Väst. 
    Libanon beslutade nyligen att 
inte lämna ut Saliba till Sverige 
med motiveringen att den döm-
de är libanesisk medborgare.  TT
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procent av de boende på den 
svenska landsbygden har förtro-
ende för regeringen, jämfört 
med 35 procent i storstäderna. 
Även förtroendet för riksdagen 
är betydligt lägre på landsbyg-
den, 22 procent jämfört med  
32 i storstäderna. Det visar sta-
tistik från Som-institutet, som 
publiceras i Dagens Nyheter. TT
